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Abstract
This thesis provides a study of the deployment of the German Bundeswehr to
Afghanistan and highlights the clash between two conflicting visions of German foreign
policy by explaining the different policies supported or opposed by an outspoken segment
of the German public and German leaders since the Second World War in regards to the
use of military force. While maintaining a focus on German military deployment to
Afghanistan, this thesis consists of an analysis of German parliamentary debate,
editorials, public opinion polls, speeches and other sources to determine arguments used
by German government leaders to try and overcome strong anti-war taboos and shift
public opinion in favor of NATO and United Nations sanctioned peacekeeping missions
abroad.
The thesis utilizes German parliamentary archives, as well as a variety of digital
newspaper and magazine archives. A substantial amount of German historical documents
have been digitized and made available online. Public opinion was determined through a
mix of public opinion polls from sources like Der Spiegel, through public statements by
peace activists, videos of peace protests, and articles and opinion pieces in newspapers
and magazines like Der Spiegel, Die Zeit, and Berliner Zeitung. Accounts on the
Afghanistan conflict by German soldiers influenced public opinion about whether or not
Germany should be deployed in Afghanistan. Speeches by Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder
and Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer are important since Fischer and Schroeder were the
two driving forces in Germany’s involvement in Afghanistan. A large percentage of
German parliamentary debates since 1949 have been digitized and made available online.
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These debates opened a window to government level discussions and how public opinion
was being addressed.
This thesis concludes that the German government’s attempts at gaining public
support for the war in Afghanistan were not very successful. Although the arguments
implemented by the government were not wholly ineffective and managed to maintain a
high enough level of support for the first few years of the war to justify a continued troop
presence, an ongoing drop in support led to eventual withdrawal. The three main themes
employed in support of the war--supporting Germany’s allies, atoning for Germany’s past
mistakes, and the need for humanitarian aid--fell on increasingly deaf ears in Germany.
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Introduction
“National Socialism can justly lay claim to Prussiandom. All over Germany,
wherever we National Socialists stand, we are Prussians. The idea we carry is Prussian.
The symbols for which we fight are filled with the spirit of Prussia, and the objectives we
hope to achieve are a renewed form of the ideals for which Frederick William I, the Great
Frederick and Bismarck once strove.”1In a speech in 1932, Josef Goebbels highlighted a
connection between Prussian and Imperial German militarism and Nazism to establish a
sense of continuity between the Nazi present and the Prussian past to create a sense of
historical legitimacy for Nazi actions. After Otto von Bismarck’s wars of German
unification, the military had come to occupy a special place in German society. Hitler
stated that the “German Empire owed its very existence to the resplendent heroism and
death defying courage of its soldiers…” and that “with marvelous sharpness that not
material qualities, but ideal virtues alone make possible the formation of a state.”2
Military strength had long been viewed as the foundation of Germany and German ideals,
and as the main tool in enforcing domestic and foreign policies.
Within a short six year span, German views on the use of military drastically
altered. As the Second World War ended, the weight of German public opinion shifted
from a mentality of war to one of peace. During World War II, many Germans became
disillusioned with war and the role of the military in foreign policy. Later decades saw
the German military become synonymous with race war, genocide, the targeting of
civilians, the murder of children, and other horrendous atrocities. Peace movements
1

Quote from Christopher Clark, Iron Kingdom: The Rise and Downfall of Prussia, 1600-1947, (Belknap
Press, 2008), 658.
2
Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf (Houghton Mifflin Company, 1998), trans. Ralph Manheim, 139.

2

emerged across postwar Germany and attempted to prevent any use of the military
outside of German borders by the German government. A conflict of interest and ideals
arose between large and varied sections of the German public and the Adenauer
administration. The former wanted to prevent any reoccurrence of military involvement
in foreign affairs, and the latter believed that Germany’s interests abroad were best served
by establishing a strong German presence in the world and by allying with NATO against
the Soviet Union.
I intend to demonstrate how Germany’s participation in the invasion of
Afghanistan highlights the clash between two conflicting visions of German foreign
policy by explaining the different policies supported or opposed by an outspoken segment
of the German public and German leaders since the Second World War in regards to the
use of military force. While maintaining my focus on German military deployment in
Afghanistan, I will analyze German parliamentary debate, editorials, public opinion polls,
speeches and other sources to determine arguments used by German government leaders
to try and overcome strong anti-war taboos and shift public opinion in favor of NATO
and UN sanctioned peacekeeping missions abroad..
The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union pushed the newly
reunited Germany into new and unfamiliar territory. The breakup of the Soviet Union, the
unification with East Germany, and the end of Cold War hostilities meant that German
borders were suddenly free of enemies and Germany was being asked by its allies, like
the United States, to help police the world and establish peace through military shows of
force. German leaders wanted to take a larger role in international politics, but a majority
of the German public remained opposed to using military force outside of Germany.
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The reluctance among a large segment of the German public to support military
missions abroad was partially overcome by the atrocities committed in Yugoslavia during
the 1990s, and grudging support was given for German military missions designed to
bring peace in the Yugoslavian conflict. A new era for German foreign policy dawned as
Germany started to become more broadly involved in international peacekeeping
missions through NATO and the United Nations. A repetitive cycle of conflict between
public opinion and foreign policy leaders began to develop as German leaders sought to
overcome decades old taboos and shift public opinion in favor of military missions while
working to establish Germany’s place in the new post-Cold War world order. Few events
highlight this conflict better than Germany’s involvement in Afghanistan. When terrorist
attacks demolished the World Trade Center in New York, many countries, including
Germany, pledged their support to the United States. Germany sent troops into
Afghanistan in 2001 to aid the American war effort and the German deployment initially
enjoyed support from a majority of the German public. Most Germans were supportive of
America’s initial right to be in Afghanistan, because of the terrorist attacks on September
11, and thought that the German army was deploying to hand out humanitarian aid and
rebuild Afghanistan.
Shortly after invading Afghanistan, the German presence in Afghanistan began to
be questioned and vigorously protested in Germany. German leaders, like Chancellor
Gerhard Schroeder and Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer, were forced to defend their
actions and provide explanations with the goal of garnering support for continued
German involvement in Afghanistan. They immediately drew on explanations and
arguments which had begun to develop during the Yugoslavia Crisis in the nineties. One
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such argument was the importance of providing humanitarian aid to oppressed people in
Afghanistan. A second argument pointed out that Germany needed to support its allies,
like the United States, instead of standing alone like during the world wars. “Never
alone” referred to the German commitment to seeking an international consensus and no
longer focusing solely on German national interest.3 The third major argument suggested
that Germany’s war guilt for the atrocities committed during World War II should
continue to drive foreign policy decisions.
These arguments were designed to appeal to German collective memory and guilt.
This paper will look to identify the German public’s rejection of Germany’s foreign
policy in regards to military involvement in Afghanistan and demonstrate how
Afghanistan showcases Germany’s current dilemma as it tries to come to terms with its
military past and its current place in the world. The Iraq War in 2003 will be discussed as
well to show how German protest against deployment in Afghanistan led to a strong
outcry against continued war in the Middle East.
Afghanistan served as a breaking point for German military expansion. The crisis
in Yugoslavia was the event that convinced Germans to send their troops out into Europe
again, but Afghanistan was the first time since World War II that German openly
protested the deployment of their own military. The genocide in Yugoslavia gave the
German government a strong argument for humanitarian aid and many German peace
activists were so shocked by the events in Yugoslavia that they did not protest, but the
invasion of Afghanistan provided a weaker pretext that struggled to overcome German
3

“Never alone” signifies Germany’s firm embedding in the community of Western democracies. The
slogan indicates that Germany no longer aimed to focus solely on national self-interest, but instead
looked to cooperate with a larger international community to accomplish unified goals.
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anti-war taboos. German criticisms of Afghanistan set the stage for further and larger
demonstrations against the war in Iraq. However, the war in Afghanistan and the
subsequent protest against Iraq did demonstrate that many Germans were willing to
commit troops to the fight against international terrorism, but not for revenge or to aid an
ally seeking to expand their influence in the Middle East.
Current research and writings about Germany’s re-emergence as a military force
in international politics tend to leave a number of holes that require filling to gain a better
understanding of the internal German debate regarding its military contributions to
international conflict. Many historians, like Philip Everts and Anja Dalgaard-Nielsen, fail
to account for the degree to which German public opinion affected decisions made and
influenced actions taken by German leaders.4 In fact, any successes of German protest
and peace movements since the 1950s are often downplayed by historians due to the fact
that there was often no apparent direct effect on German foreign and security policy.
Dalgaard-Nielsen states very strongly that she does not believe that public opinion has
affected German security policy at all since so many unpopular policies have been
pushed through since the end of World War Two.5 While Dalgaard-Nielsen is not
necessarily wrong, she and other historians miss the significance of the scramble by the
German government to gain public support for actions taken. Germany’s move to send
troops into Afghanistan represents a moment in German history where an unpopular
policy was pushed through and then followed up with a hasty attempt to overcome
cultural taboos to try and shift public opinion in favor of military involvement. The
4

Anja Dalgaard-Nielsen, Germany, Pacifism, and Peace Enforcement (Manchester: Manchester University
Press, 2006) and Philip Everts, Public Opinion and the International Use of Force (Taylor and Francis,
2001).
5
Dalgaard-Nielsen, 14-15.
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arguments used to shift public opinion strongly indicate that public opinion factored into
government decisions, but that there were also other outside and historical pressures
being placed on Germany’s leaders. This paper adds to the existing historiography by
showing how different interpretations of Germany’s past by the German public and
German leaders created two conflicting perspectives on how Germany should handle
international problems. These two perspectives were highlighted by Germany sending
military missions into Afghanistan in 2001 and the subsequent German internal conflict
regarding Germany’s security policies.
Other historians, like Alice Holmes Cooper,6 focus very much on the German
peace movements and tend to ignore its interactions with the government as well as the
reactions by the government to these movements. Cooper does point out that while no
German peace movements were hugely successful, they did serve to properly articulate
the feelings of the German public towards out-of-area military involvement, caused the
German parliament to consider peaceful alternatives, and created cultural norms for how
Germans thought about the use of military force. However, Cooper and other peace
movement historians view the successes and failures of public opinion only from the side
of German peace movements and make no real move to bridge the gap between public
opinion and government actions. This paper will take into account the immediate move
by the government to shift public opinion in favor of Afghanistan since continued
disapproval would, and probably did, affect whether the Schroeder administration
remained in power. An important distinction will be that public protest successes are not

6

Alice Holmes Cooper, Paradoxes of Peace: German Peace Movements since 1945 (Ann Arbor: University
of Michigan Press, 1997).
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immediately apparent, but instead create a constituency that can influence change in other
ways, like voting.
Histories

concerning

Germany’s

greater

involvement

in

international

peacekeeping missions focus on either the Yugoslavia Crisis, where Germany fought for
the first time since World War Two, or Germany’s refusal to participate in Iraq in 2003.
German deployment and the surrounding protests and domestic debate concerning
military deployment in Afghanistan are largely ignored by historians. Academic history
journals, like Res Militaris, offer more focused insight on specifics of Germany’s
involvement in Afghanistan. However, they tend to focus on how Germany’s military
performed in Afghanistan, include discussions on whether Germany was correct in
sending troops to the Middle East, or debate the changes in German security policies in
regards to out-of-area deployment.. This paper will seek to take a step back and look at a
bigger picture. What arguments and perspectives informed the domestic debate over
military deployment? How did the government try to shift public opinion and overcome
cultural taboos in regards to deployment in Afghanistan? What historical forces and
interpretations of how Germany should use its military drove each side of the debate?
This paper contends that most postwar Germans have expected their foreign
policy to embrace a multilateral approach to solving international problems since the
1950s. Multilateralism can be defined as multiple countries working together to solve any
particular issue. Diplomacy becomes more important, the military is asked to cooperate
with other organizations, and military power becomes less important to the overall
solution. Instead of a strong military intervention, Germans in general expected a more
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multilateralist approach from their government and military and became agitated when
Germany and other countries seem to focus too unilaterally on the use of military force.
German public opinion and its conflict with German foreign policy are at the crux
of this paper. Public opinion can be a difficult to measure since polls only give so much
information about what people truly think. Philip Everts writes that the traditionalist view
states that public opinion is irrational and therefore ignored by the government, but the
revisionists write that public opinion is rational and informed and should be able to
effectively influence foreign policy. Naturally, the truth falls somewhere in the middle.
Few scholars will probably argue that public opinion is completely irrational and this
paper also strongly believes in the influence of opinion on governmental policies.
German protest movements may not often have achieved their ultimate goals, but always
achieved small successes. By the time Germany deployed to Afghanistan the German
government seemed to feel that public opinion cannot be ignored even if the original
policy had already been pushed through. A variety of methods were employed by the
author of this thesis to ascertain the effect of public opinion on the German state and its
effect on foreign policy. These methods included looking at organized and disorganized
groups, studying effective protests and the evolution of public opinion in Germany,
utilizing published interviews with elites, and understanding the importance of public
opinion by understanding the minds of important politicians and leaders.
Both the German public and government felt that they had to deal with concerns
over German militarism. Militarism is the belief that a country needs to maintain a strong
military capability and be prepared to use it aggressively to defend or promote national
interests. The military is often glorified in a militaristic system and becomes the symbol
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of the state. Prior to World War Two, the German military viewed itself as the true
embodiment of the German state and fought to maintain its political autonomy and place
of authority within German society before being subsumed by Hitler and the Nazi party.
The military failed to stand up to Hitler and even aided his rise to power before swearing
oaths of allegiance to the Fuehrer. Much of the anti-militarism that swept through
Germany after the defeat of Hitler was a result of Germans trying to eliminate any
possibility of the military wielding the same power. Even though the German military
had lost much of its autonomy during the Third Reich the military had a history of
regaining power swiftly after defeats, like after the Revolution of 1848 or after World
War I. The protest against Afghanistan was largely driven by the post-World War II
German distaste for war, but also represented a conflict over finding the balance between
judicious use of military forces while avoiding the mistakes that had been made in the
past.
Public opinion was determined through a mix of public opinion polls from
sources like Der Spiegel, through public statements by peace activists, videos of peace
protests, and articles and opinion pieces in newspapers and magazines like Der Spiegel,
Die Zeit, and Berliner Zeitung. Accounts on the Afghanistan conflict by German soldiers
influenced public opinion about whether or not Germany should be deployed in
Afghanistan.7 Several compilations of letters by German soldiers out of Afghanistan can
be found in books like Feldpost which was published in 2011.

7

In Germany’s “Soldier Laws,” German soldiers are encouraged to maintain strong opinions and remain
politically involved even while overseas.
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Speeches by Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder and Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer
are important since Fischer and Schroeder were the two driving forces in Germany’s
involvement in Afghanistan. A large percentage of German parliamentary debates since
1949 have been digitized and made available online. These debates opened a window to
government level discussions and how public opinion was being addressed. A poignant
moment from this source is Schroeder’s impassioned speech to the Bundestag for
Germany to become involved in Afghanistan shortly after the September 11 attacks.
Other sources include the German constitution, outside analysis of German actions by
American newspapers, as well as a variety of letters and speeches.
This paper focuses on a relatively recent event and must properly ground itself in
the history leading up to Germany’s involvement in Afghanistan to provide a proper
perspective and understanding. Therefore, the paper is broken up into several chapters.
Chapter 1 will explain the origins of taboos against the use of military force. Part of that
explanation includes an overview of the German military’s role in determining foreign
and security policy, how that helped involve German in the horrors of World War One
and especially World War Two, and how the German mindset on military force as a
political tool changed after the Second World War. Chapter 1 will continue to outline the
development of the German peace movements and provide an understanding of the
conflict between German peace movements and the German government regarding issues
like German re-armament. This chapter will discuss policy changes that resulted from
peace movement successes and helped lay the foundation for the relationship between the
German government and German peace movements at the end of the Cold War. Before
the end of the Cold War, the German government would not have felt as strongly
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compelled to try and quickly and strongly justify any actions taken against the will of the
public, but now Germany is no longer in Afghanistan and is still defending their presence
in the Middle East. Continued explanations and arguments put forth by the German
government indicate that German leaders feel that they need support from a majority of
the German public on foreign and security policy decisions.
Chapter 2 seeks to explain why the German government would feel compelled to
launch military campaigns despite public disapproval. The chapter provides a quick
overview of Germany diplomacy and Germany’s re-emergence as a world power and an
international peacekeeping force. German foreign policy starting with Chancellor Konrad
Adenauer in the 1950s established policies which led to the re-armament of Germany and
firmly planted Germany within Western politics. Adenauer’s policies continued to
strongly influence subsequent German leaders regardless of their political leanings as
Germany remained firmly entrenched in the West. This chapter will also detail the
expansions of international involvement by German military forces and the development
of arguments by government leaders to justify their actions. A brief discussion of
Germany’s refusal to fight in the First Gulf War and the initial involvement by German
forces in former Yugoslavia informs the later debate over the invasion of Afghanistan.
Arguments justifying the use of German military force were first strongly used, and
mostly accepted, during the war in Yugoslavia. Afghanistan represents a moment the
German government felt that Germany had a duty to atone for its past, support its allies,
and provide humanitarian aid to the oppressed people in Afghanistan, but was then forced
to strongly defend its stance against public disapproval.
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Chapter 3 starts by demonstrating how Germany threw its support behind the
United States and looked to aid America in Afghanistan. Reactions by the public against
the subsequent deployment of German troops and casualties are explored next. This
chapter tries to show the various arguments used by the government to sway public
opinion and how policy regarding Afghanistan changed or was adjusted because of antiwar feelings. Approval for the war dropped throughout period characterized in this
chapter and soon Germany began contemplating withdrawal.
Chapter 4 addresses some of the overlapping years of protest against Afghanistan
and Iraq. Many Germans were opposed to fighting in Afghanistan, but found themselves
willing to at least partially tolerate the war as long as nothing increased German
involvement and pushed Germany towards heavier fighting. The United State began
looking towards a war with Iraq in 2002 and Germany’s tolerance bursts. AntiAmericanism reappeared in German politics and German protests as Germans took to the
streets to protest further fighting in the Middle East. Schroeder rides the anti-war feelings
to re-elections as he completely changes his stance on deploying German troops overseas.
The concluding chapter synthesizes the information gathered and reiterates how
German collective memory and war guilt will continue to push Germany towards a
multilateral and generally peaceful foreign policy in the foreseeable future.
Post-World War Two Germany has evolved to become a very different political
entity than the one that lost the war. German people have developed a reputation as
peacemakers and humanitarians instead of war hungry barbarians. German responses to
Afghanistan and Iraq demonstrate that war is something to be approached carefully and
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that the majority of Germans have rejected German militarism and will seek to keep their
government moving down a peaceful path.

14

The Rise of German Anti-Militarism
When Germany voted to send troops over to Afghanistan in 2001 the German
government was forced to defend its decision against a strongly anti-war German public.
German anti-war taboos emerged regarding armed conflict and the use of the military
since World War II. Germany had a long history of being a fairly militarized state, but
since World War II most Germans had developed a new and more pacifistic attitude
towards international conflict resolution and what it meant to be German and obey the
state. No longer would Germans follow a strong and authoritarian government without
asking questions and making their opinions heard.
The decades following World War 2 witnessed the evolution of the German public’s
interactions with the German government and set the stage for the debate concerning
Germany’s deployment of troops into an overseas conflict for the first time since the war.
Since Germany’s unification in 1871, Germany’s public moved from generally
respecting and obeying the authority of Imperial Germany and having a military oriented
mindset to openly protesting perceived expansions of military authority or possible
foreign conflict after World War II. Isabel V. Hull argues that Prussia and Imperial
Germany developed the groundwork of a military state that was inclined to pursue total
solutions to military problems. Post-war German politicians, like Chancellor Konrad
Adenauer, blamed Prussian militarism for the rise of Nazism. Decades of on again-off
again peace movements developed and matured throughout the decades after the Second
World War as Germans began to face their war guilt and developed newer philosophies
regarding peace. Each protest learned something new about dealing with the government
even as most peace movements were basically shunted aside. The modern domestic
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debate concerning German troop deployment to Afghanistan appears to be the
culminating point in the development of the relationship between the German state and
public. Prussia has long been considered the wellspring of German and European
militarism. Prussia had been colonized in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries by the
Knights of the Teutonic Order, a military order of German monks. 8 By the sixteenth
century, the Hohenzollern family had regained control of the region, using Berlin as their
base, and established a kingdom that would last until German unification in 1870. Several
effective Prussian rulers strongly encouraged the creation of a professional army and
proceeded to expand Prussian rule through the use of a military that was unusually wellorganized and effective. By the eighteenth century, Prussia boasted the most well trained
and modern army in Europe. Heavy taxes supported the military and nearly 80 percent of
state revenues were budgeted to the army.9
The officer corps of the Prussian army took on an aristocratic character as the
Junkers received the right to select officers.10 By the mid-eighteenth century, the Prussian
officer corps was becoming one of the most privileged social classes in Prussia. By 1900,
the status of officers had become largely independent of the social caste with which
individuals may have previously been identified. Officer training led to an increasingly
similar outlook on military procedures throughout the Prussian army. The most talented
officers were asked to join the Prussian General Staff for a few months and were then
sent out to command soldiers in the field. The military came to occupy a place of power
outside of the civilian government and brooked little interference in its affairs from
8

Christopher Clark, Iron Kingdom: The Rise and Downfall of Prussia, 1600-1947, (Belknap Press, 2008), 10.
Clark, 25-103.
10
Extremely wealthy landowners. Dominated Prussian politics.
9
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civilian sources. Under the Prussian king, Frederick the Great, Prussia was often referred
to as an “army with a state attached.”11 The German Empire was united under Otto von
Bismarck between 1864 and 1871 and put under the authority of Prussia’s military
oriented royal family.
Culturally, Germans in the empire were viewed by rest of Europe as serious,
efficient, and generally obedient. The middle class of Germany had developed a fairly
strong attachment to the state. Attachment to the army and the reserve officer corps was
one aspect of that. The state provided clear familial and societal roles for men and women
and stood for the manly virtues that the middle class held dear: seriousness, respect, and
rectitude. Outside viewers commented on what seemed like complete German
subservience to the state. The American criminologist Raymond Fosdick noticed that
there seemed to a surprising number of Verboten signs in Imperial Germany to which
“the law-abiding German invariably and instinctively submits.”12 Heinrich Mann,
strongly critiqued Imperial German society in his fictional novel, Der Untertan, by
pointing out the self-abasement of the German middle class and also the depth of the
military culture’s pervasion into civilian life. Historian David Blackbourne argues that
Germans were not innately docile, but that they lived in a world of institutions that sought
to discipline them. Some institutions would receive resistance, especially from the lower
classes, but their capacity to shape society was considerable.13
The military was the most prominent institution shaping Imperial German society
and its presence was visible everywhere: in barracks, drills, maneuvers, regimental bands,
11

Isabel V. Hull, Absolute Destruction: Military Culture and Practices in Imperial Germany (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 2006), 103.
12
Quote from David Blackbourne, The Long Nineteenth Century: A History of Germany, 1790-1918 (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 372.
13
Blackbourne, 374.
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and military parades. Blackbourne writes that gymnastic clubs and schools promoted
soldierly virtues and that many schools would sing martial songs in the mornings and that
an appropriate response to the questions, “What do you want to be?” was “Soldier, Sir!”14
The army began to dominate foreign policy decisions, and also had a strong impact at
home as German society became militarized. The symbol of this power was the uniform.
Soldiers had special legal privileges and civilians were expected to step aside and allow
an officer to pass on the street. Military legal privileges caused resentment among the
propertied and educated, military officers displayed open contempt for anyone below
them, and “undesirables,” such as Jews and Catholics, were kept out of the officer
corps.15
Despite some visible resentment of the military by German civilians, the high
prestige of the military cannot be doubted. The military was viewed as the architect of
German unification and even had its own national holiday of Sedan Day which celebrated
the defeat of Napoleon III during the Franco-Prussian War. Many middle class Germans
were drawn to the army as a symbol of the nation’s resolve. Invitations to the mess were
sought as badges of insider status, and the harsh, authoritarian tones of military routine
seeped into civilian life. Diederich Hessling, the central character of Heinrich Mann’s
book, remains the fictional embodiment of this. Hessling is unthinkingly obedient to
authority and extremely dedicated to the nationalist goals of the German state, while also
being domineering towards those below him in status. The reserve officer corps was the
principal conduits for military values into civilian life. Members were schooled in

14
15

Blackbourne, 374.
Clark, 571.
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conformism and respect for military virtues. There are many examples of men who were
more proud of their military rank than their civilian accomplishments.16
Soldiers were not the only men who wore uniforms in Imperial Germany.
Customs officers, postal workers, state mine officials, railway men and foresters all
donned military style uniforms as part of their jobs. Braiding and piping were as
commonplace as titles.17 This went beyond personal appearance. Former soldiers were
given preference in many parts of the non-military bureaucracy through a system of
military candidates for posts. Despite the fact that the ‘character’ bred in the army was a
poor substitute for the specialized training increasingly required in civilian bureaucracy,
former soldiers still set the tone of German officialdom in its dealings with the public.
The tone was usually described as barsch, harsh or brusque. The police forces were
strongly recruited from the military and expected to act according to their military
training.18
Social militarism and the increase in German bureaucratic efficiency led liberal
Franz von Roggenbach to complain that the ‘perfect state’ had reduced individuals to the
‘level of trained machines.’ The population of pre-war Germany had become used to an
ordered society, centered upon military and bureaucratic efficiency, but Imperial
Germany was not a militaristic caricature. Democracy was being practiced on a
surprisingly large scale and traditions of protesting the government and creating change
based on public opinion and grass roots movements were already being developed in

16

Clark, 600.
Military braiding and piping are forms of uniform enhancement. Piping is usually stripes down a uniform
and braiding is ornamental decoration on uniforms, like the little braids hanging off of shoulder epaulets.
18
Hull, 193.
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19

Imperial Germany, creating a foundation for post-World War II peace movements and
how they interacted with the German government.
Historian Margaret Anderson writes that “no contemporary would have described
the Kaiserreich as a democracy; but men could, and did, describe some of its practices
and attitudes as democratic, and many of its politicians as democrats.” 19 Anderson argues
that democratic in the nineteenth century often meant plebian and that democracy was
plebian enfranchisement. In fact, Germans in Imperial Germany were rapidly
transforming a segmentary, authoritarian, and communal culture that abhorred
partisanship into a more participatory and public culture. Voter turnout for local and
national elections was high and many of the election races were extremely competitive.20
The German Empire itself has been called “dualistic” because of the clear
separation of powers, in both Prussia and the Reich, between the non-elected executive
and the elected legislature. Powerful positions, like the Emperor and Chancellor, were not
elected and the German parliament was largely elected. Bismarck introduced universal
manhood suffrage in Reichstag elections, but had done so to try and outflank the liberals
who were criticizing him heavily in parliament. The new universal suffrage actually led
to multiple new political parties in parliament who all criticized Bismarck, so his ploy
was largely unsuccessful. Parliamentary elections began to revolve around the common
man and large percentages of Germans turned out to vote. Blackbourne describes the
German voter as a potent and active agent of change.21

19

Margaret Lavinia Anderson, Practicing Democracy: Elections and Political Culture in Imperial Germany
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), 19.
20
Anderson, 4.
21
Anderson,20.
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Large strides towards a more democratic state were made between 1871 and
1914, but German democracy’s roots were not deep enough to survive a world war.
Courtiers and royal favorites to Wilhelm II played an important role in Imperial
Germany. The Kaiser had three private secret cabinets, for civil, military, and naval
affairs, that acted in an advisory role to the Kaiser, but were described as “a kind of
shadow government”22 with better access to the Emperor than the chancellor himself. The
power of these extra-constitutional institutions led historian Hans-Peter Ullman to
describe the Empire as a “military state.”23 There was no single institution with
responsibility for military planning and no clear chain of command between the Military
Cabinet, the Prussian War Ministry and the army’s General Staff. Military spending was
a point of contention between the military and the National Assembly as well, since the
German constitution created by Bismarck fudged the issue of army funding. Bismarck
had written the constitution so that the Reichstag would have very little control over
money flowing to the military and that there would be no civilian officials to oversee
army procedure. The German monarchy was strongly influenced by the military and
Wilhelm II was often seen in public wearing military uniform and surrounded by military
advisors. Many government officials who spoke out against the military found
themselves pushed out of office. In 1909 Chancellor Bernhard von Buelow was removed
from office for protesting too much against military actions taken against African rebels
in South-western Africa. Imperial Germany may have had a growing and vibrant
democratic culture evolving within its borders, but the lack of oversight over the military
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led to an increased focus by Germany on the arms race that began to sweep through
Europe and laid the foundation for a world war.24
Kaiser Wilhelm II heartily endorsed German military expansion and
modernization because he wanted to retain his country’s “place in the sun.” Wilhelm II
was particularly interested in increasing his navy size and contesting Great Britain’s
control of the seas. Great Britain and other European countries moved to match German
naval expansion and as a result European military expenditure skyrocketed between 1900
and 1914. By 1913, Germany was spending more on its military than any other country in
Europe. Only Russia, with a much larger army, came anywhere close to Germany’s
expenditures.

Nation

1908

1909

1910

1911

1912

1913

Great Britain

$286.7m

$306.2m

$330.4m

$345.1m

$349.9m

$374.2m

Germany

$286.7m

$306.8m

$301.5m

$303.9m

$331.5m

$463.6m

France

$216m

$236.4m

$248m

$277.9m

$307.8m

$363.8m

Russia

$291.6m

$315.5m

$324m

$334.5m

$387m

$435m

Italy

$87.5m

$115.8m

$124.9m

$133.7m

$158.4m

$142.2m

United States

$189.5m

$199m

$197m

$197m

$227m

$244.6m

Japan

$93.7m

$95.7m

$100.2m

$110.7m

$107.7m

$104.6m

Source: Jacobson’s World Armament Expenditure, 1935
Table 1: Chart of European military expenditures. Germany tops the chart leading up to World War I.

The European arms race culminated in World War I and the desolation of the
European continent. Germany won many initial victories, but a long war of attrition led to
a German defeat. Throughout the war, the German army became known for carrying out
a variety of atrocities. Early in the war German troops began shooting Belgian and
24
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French civilians out of frustration over resistance, suspicion of the foreign population,
drunkenness, etc. Historians John Horne and Alan Kramer wrote that crimes of excess
began within the first day of the war starting and were widespread throughout the
German army. During the first two months of the war, 129 major incidents of execution
occurred. Horne and Kramer concluded that the crimes were first committed by common
soldiers and low-ranking officers, but that these acts were soon approved by higher
ranking-officers and systematized in orders at the army level and above. 25 Moltke, for
example, “ordered that civilians engaging in combat would be summarily executed, an
order repeated on the 26th.”26
After surrendering, the majority of Germans did not accept blame for the First
World War. The Treaty of Versailles placed the blame for the conflict squarely on the
backs of the German people and made them pay for their part in it with wartime
reparations and massive restrictions on military manpower. Germans created the “stab in
the back” legend and dreams of German military dominance lived on in parts of German
society, especially within conservative right wing groups. The “stab in the back” legend
was a notion widely believed in right wing circles that the German Army did not lose
World War I, but was betrayed by the civilians on the home front. The legend
undermined public trust in the Weimar republic, Germany’s post-war civilian
government, and painted the liberal Social Democratic Party (SPD) as treacherous and
unpatriotic. The legend also served to protect the prestige and position of the German
military and its commanders. Despite their failures in 1918, military commanders like
Paul von Hindenburg and Erich Ludendorff managed to retain their status and influence
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in the new republic. Evidence of this can be seen in the election of Hindenburg, who
publicly supported the “stab in the back legend,” as president of the republic in 1925.
Ludendorff also publicly promoted the idea of the legend and later worked to further
undermine the Weimar Republic by participating in attempted coup d’états in 1920 and
1923.27
The Weimar Republic was also weak and divided with too many parties and no
strong representative body. The President was given powers to overrule the Reichstag
and historians have suggested that the German president was not far removed from the
former emperor in terms of power. The ability of the president to bypass the Reichstag
and call on his emergency powers happened frequently, due to regular stalemates in the
Reichstag, and served only to cause further divisions in the government. The Weimar
Republic was democratic, but the electoral system felt inherently democratic because
seats in the Reichstag were awarded based on what percentage of the vote a party
received. The problem with proportional voting was that it prevented any realistic chance
of a majority government. Coalitions were required to pass policy and these coalitions
were often fractious and fragile. The presence of so many parties and interests hindered
debate in the Reichstag and made passing legislation difficult.
German militarism, nationalism and faith in authoritarianism survived the war and
also served to undermine Weimar democracy. The main repositories for these ideas were
military organizations, including the Reichswehr, the Freikorps, various ex-soldiers’
leagues, and political organizations on the Right like the Nazis. Military leaders like Paul
von Hindenburg, who should have been disgraced into retirement by the defeat of 1918,
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remained as heroes and important political players in the new society. The ‘old days of
empire’ under Bismarck and authoritarian monarchy had ended in a disastrous war, yet
they were often romanticized and recalled as better times.
Parties like the Nazis and the Communist Party offered anti-democratic platforms
that sought the destruction of parliamentary democracy and managed to undermine interwar democracy even further. Hitler gained support for his political ambitions through the
Nazi party’s organization and rallies and managed to use the Great Depression to expand
the influence of his party. They toned down their anti-Semitic and anti-republican
language between 1924 and 1932 and managed to gain more seats in the Reichstag. In
1933, Hitler was appointed as the chancellor of the Weimar republic. Political pressure
from former Chancellor, Franz von Papen, convinced President Hindenburg to appoint
Hitler and further intrigue gave Hitler full control over the German government signaling
the end of the Weimar Republic and setting the stage for another world war.
Hitler made immediate moves to help Germany regain its military glory. He reestablished the military, which had been Germany’s symbol of national identity, as the
true defenders of Germany. The army had been severely reduced by the Treaty of
Versailles and felt threated by the Nazi party’s brown shirted Stormtroopers who seemed
to be taking over as the strongest militant force in Germany. Hitler restored military
authority over national defense by disbanding the Sturmabteilung in exchange for oaths
of loyalty from German military officers. Numerous military leaders still opposed Hitler,
but were too scared to openly speak out against him as Nazi supporters began to infiltrate
and fill up the German military ranks. He stoked the fires of German nationalism by
promising expansion and a return of German superiority in Europe. Much of Hitler’s
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focus was on creating a military that the German people could truly believe in again as
the foundation of a strong German state. The Nazi party was a fairly militarized political
party and had actively used storm trooper thugs to influence elections leading up to
Hitler’s rise to power and enforce policies, but eventually re-created Germany’s
professional military with nobility at the core of its officer corps. The wealth of Germany
in the 1930s went into the military and Hitler spearheaded one of the greatest expansions
of industrial production and civil improvement Germany had ever seen. The growth of
military industry created new jobs and sparked German economic growth that supported
civil improvements, as well as military expansion. March 16, 1935 saw the reintroduction of conscription as Hitler chose to openly reject the military restrictions set
for by the Treaty of Versailles.28 Re-armament had already begun before Hitler became
chancellor. Troops were trained and outfitted secretly and officers were rotated through
schools, so that the German General Staff would remain basically intact and well trained.
Police were basically trained as military reserves and had the training to be called up and
fight at any time. Hitler moved ahead much more aggressively with re-armament and
made it the government’s top priority. Secret flying schools were established and dummy
companies were set up to fund the production of weapons and the training of soldiers. By
1935, Hitler was openly flouting the Treaty of Versailles and had reintroduced
conscription. Hitler’s policies led to nearly full employment during the 1930s and
brought many German industries out of the Great Depression.
On September 1, 1939, Hitler invaded Poland and the Second World War started
as France and Great Britain chose to declare war on Germany. Hitler’s aggressive re-
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militarization of Germany allowed the German army to dominate Europe for four years
before losing on most fronts over the last two years of the war. German dreams of
national superiority turned into nightmares over the course of the war as the military
carried out atrocities throughout Europe. Prussia had long been known for its brutality in
war, but after the Second World War the full extent of German military barbarity began
to hit home for many Germans. The army had been used to uproot entire populations
before the war to create buffer zones. The perceptions of German soldiers were skewed
by indoctrination instructing them that World War 2 was a race war. German soldiers
were supposed to fight to protect the racial purity of Germans everywhere. Concentration
camps were built for Jews and other undesirables as nearly 6 million Jews were killed by
Hitler’s Final Solution. The German army also became known for its murderous
retaliatory instincts. Their devastating impact can be seen in examples such as the 1941
reprisals in Serbia where over 2,000 civilians were shot in the small town Kragjevac
alone or the total demolition of the Vieux Quartier in Marseille with the evacuation of its
40,000 inhabitants after a few roadside bombs had exploded in the city.
Germany’s invasion of the Soviet Union highlighted the full extent of the
German military’s capacity for barbarism. In the summer of 1941, the German Armed
Forces High Command ordered the shooting of all political commissars of the Soviet
army who were taken prisoners. Most of the German armed forces complied with this
order. The Nazis believed that the Slavic peoples were useless sub-humans and therefore,
the Soviet elite were to be killed while the remainder of the population should be
enslaved or expelled further eastward. As a result, millions of Soviet civilians were
deliberately killed, starved, or worked to death. Millions of others were deported for
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forced labor in Germany or enslaved in the occupied eastern territories. German planners
called for the ruthless exploitation of Soviet resources, especially agricultural produce.
Resistance against German occupation was brutally responded to as entire villages were
burned or entire populations of rural districts were shot in retaliation for partisan attacks.
German leadership made it clear that German soldiers would not be punished for any
such crimes. When Germany retreated out of Russia in 1943 the Wehrmacht began a
policy of “scorched earth” tactics to not leave anything useful for the Russians behind.
All animals, food, and even civilians populations were removed as the German army
pulled back.29
Even Western countries, such as France, suffered German brutalities. French
citizens began experiencing German pillaging, rape, and murder as the German army
swept through the countryside. One German soldier wrote in August, 1914: “We
destroyed eight houses with their inhabitants. In one of them we bayoneted two men with
their wives and girl of eighteen. The girl all but melted me; her look was so full of
innocence. But we could not repress the excitement of the troops; at such moments they
are beasts, not men.”30 Oppressive living conditions led to many people growing sick and
dying during the winter. The German army carried out many evacuations and
deportations to solve overcrowding a lack of resources. The occupying forces were also
notorious for creating forced labor gangs in occupied France. Some groups were even
sent back to Germany to work there.
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Germany lost the war and the subsequent experiences, traumas and occupation
served to strengthen and grow a national peace movement that sought to prevent German
involvement in any armed conflict again. The war ended with a horrific German loss and
the virtual destruction of Germany. German deaths during the war numbered
approximately 8,000,000 and 2,035,000 of those deaths were civilian casualties. Many of
Germany’s cities had been destroyed as well. The carpet-bombing by Allied forces
leveled up to 80 percent of the historic buildings in Germany’s main cities. Berlin,
Cologne, Leipzig, Magdeburg, Hamburg, Kiel, Luebeck, Muenster, Munich, Frankfurt,
Dresden, and many other major cities were all devastated. In West Germany alone, some
14 billion cubic feet of rubble was piled up after the war; enough to build a wall two
meters thick and seven meters high all the way around the western half of the divided
country. Germany was divided into 4 zones of control with the Soviet Union controlling
the entire Eastern half. Soviet Soldiers had committed a large number of rapes during the
end of the war and many German women continued to be raped during occupation.
Historians estimate that approximately 2 million German women were raped by the Red
Army, some women as many as 60-70 times. The number of German female deaths
related to rapes lies somewhere around 240,000 deaths. English military historian Antony
Beevor described the event as the “greatest phenomenon of mass rape in history.”31
Trust in the military had been destroyed by Germany’s loss in the Second World
War. Mark Mazower, a professor of history at Wallach University, writes that German
military planning during the war had been lacking in terms of foresight and planning.
Germany had dominated its political alliances and trusted no one. As a result, Germans
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soon found that they were standing alone against the world as a result of military actions
and political paranoia that had prevented Germany from maintaining any positive
alliances. The military was forced to accept the blame for defeat and was not able to
blame scapegoats like they had after the First World War. The German military could no
longer stand as the symbol for German unity and nationalism as it had during the height
of Prussian militarism. Germany’s military culture essentially changed overnight after the
war and was replaced by a mix of war guilt and shame. Post-war occupation by Allied
forces served to increase Germany’s humiliation and split Germans into a Capitalist West
controlled by the Allies and a communist East controlled by the Soviet Union.
Sovereignty had been lost along with a national identity and the Germans did not where
to turn.32
Germans began to resist the concept of Germany potentially re-arming. The next
several decades leading up to the War in Afghanistan would result in multiple and
escalating confrontations between the German public and the German government over
the use of the German military. Protests began in the 1950s against re-armament and
culminated in resistance towards a German military presence in Afghanistan and strong
protests against a possible invasion of Iraq. Peace movements would emerge across
Germany to prevent any use of the military outside of German borders. The clash over
military involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq would highlight the clash between two
different German interpretations of military use. The German government would try to
re-establish Germany as a power to be respected while fending off public protests and
attempting to garner support for foreign policy moves. The conflict started with
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Germany’s first democratic government after the war under Chancellor Konrad Adenauer
and German re-armament.33
Adenauer felt strongly that Prussian militarism and Germany’s former military
culture had laid the groundwork for Nazism, but still operated as a fairly authoritarian
leader and was willing to look towards West German re-armament shortly after the war.34
The United States suggested that West Germany re-build its military due to concerns over
Soviet aggressions and fears that war would break out between East and West Germany
just like the war between North and South Korea. Adenauer managed to use America’s
concerns as a bargaining chip to re-gain German sovereignty, but he ran into difficulties
with his own constituency. Polls taken in 1950 showed that over 75 percent of Germans
rejected the idea of conscription and would not allow their family members to serve as
soldiers, and a strong majority was opposed to West German participation in a European
army. A clearly anti-militarist mood existed at the beginning of the 1950s. The slogan
“Ohne Mich!” (Without me) became very popular in Germany and leading political
figures received a flood of letters from war widows, invalids and other victims of war.
Soon front doors, letter boxes, walls, pavements and trees were daubed with the words
Ohne Mich! and large letter Fs which stood for Frieden, peace.35
Adenauer approached re-armament tactfully and proceeded to outline a plan that
would make re-militarization more palatable to the German people. Germany would
focus on maintaining better relations with the rest of Europe and be a part of a European
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defense force. Adenauer emphasized that the purpose of the military was very much for
defense. He expressed no interest in expanding Germany’s military borders anymore and
the form of the military respected that. The goal was to have protection if East Germany
ever chose to attack at the behest of the Soviet Union. Soldiers would be educated as
“citizens in uniform” and be trained as citizen soldiers tasked with the defense of the
democratic state under moral leadership. Adenauer’s compromises and leadership
convinced West Germans that perhaps re-arming was not a terrible concept and by 1956
roughly two-thirds of the West German population considered re-armament to be
politically necessary.36
In 1957, Adenauer agreed to let the United States arm West Germany with
nuclear warheads as a military option against Soviet attacks. A campaign named “The
Fight Against Atomic Death” formed as part of a mass protest against nuclear weapons in
Germany. Several demonstrations in Bremen, Kiel, Muenich, Mannheim, Dortmund,
Essen, and Hamburg were carried out during April in 1958. The conservative Christian
Democratic Union managed to win a majority of seats in parliament that year and wrote
off the campaign as a communist led movement. In 1960, pacifist groups responded with
the Easter Marches, which were anti-military demonstrations that had been inspired by
similar British marches in the 1950s. The first marches were aimed towards ending the
use of nuclear weapons in every country around the world. The very first march in 1960
was attended by 1,200 people, but each year the marches grew exponentially. More cities
began hosting marches and more West Germans began attending to protest the expansion
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of military arsenals. The movement changed its name to “Campaign for Disarmament” in
1963 and became large enough to count as an extra-parliamentary group capable of
influencing opinions. The Easter Marches are considered to be the first independent new
social movement and widespread extra-parliamentary movement in the Federal Republic
of Germany. The institution of the Emergency Acts in 1968 led to the break-up of the
movement by 1969 as German peace movements briefly splintered, but the Easter
Marches were re-started in the 1980s again and continue into the present day as a rallying
point for pacifists and people who want to protest nuclear weapons and military
expansion.37
As the initial Easter Marches were being dismantled, young Germans began
practicing political activism and organizing their own protests aimed at critiquing foreign
policy and military behavior. Movements, like Kommune I and the Socialist German
Student Union, started comparing American actions in Vietnam to Nazi actions during
the Second World War and also began criticizing domestic policies. West Germany’s
liberal protest movements were concerned with seemingly fascist and imperialist
American foreign policies and West German domestic policies. Some historians, like
Bernd Greiner and Michael Geyer, wrote that anti-Americanism was at the core of the
late sixties student protests. Greiner wrote that Germans used Vietnam to strike out and
gain revenge on the United States for the Nuremberg trials and Geyer wrote that Germans
were envious of the American and still bitter about the Nuremberg trials. However, antiAmericanism did not seem to truly be the focus of the student protest movements. The
students were critical of specific American actions without criticizing America and its
culture directly. Left wing publications mainly spoke out against American military
37
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actions in Vietnam, CIA involvement with right wing paramilitary groups and American
support for right wing and military dictatorships worldwide.
The Federal Republic of Germany was not immune to similar criticism as
relatively large protests and publications called out the FRG for proposing to pass
emergency laws in 1968 which would serve to curb civilian’s rights during times of
national crisis. Recent histories have mostly ignored the protest against the Emergency
Laws and have been fairly critical of the 1968 protests in general. 38 Historians, like Goetz
Aly, wrote that the student movements created dangerous militant groups that were
actually counterproductive to Germany’s democracy.39 Aly was not wrong in criticizing
the dangerous splinter groups that emerged from the student protests, but ignores the
positive contributions of the movement. The student uprising of the late sixties did not
manage to force any sweeping governmental changes or even prevent the emergency
laws from being passed in 1968, but were able to set certain processes in motion that
influenced future confrontations between the German government and the German
public. German students were able to initiate conversations about democracy, fascism,
nationalism, morality, and Germany’s place in the world. By striking out against
perceived imperialism and fascism the West German students changed German protest
culture and provided impetus and groundwork for future political movements.
The West German government passed the Emergency Laws in 1968 without
much in the way of apology towards the protestors. The student movements splintered
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soon after the bill was passed. The movement did bring about one small, but significant
change that would influence further interactions between the German public and its
government. A paragraph was added to Article XX of the German constitution which
officially gave the people of Germany the right, if no other remedy was possible, to resist
anyone trying to circumvent the constitutional laws. The use of the German military
would soon become a constitutional issue. While not achieving the radical changes that
they sought, the students did manage to reorient West German society. Members of
political student groups, like the SDS and Kommune I, generated public conversations
about fascism and the Nazi past in a country where the older generation was often silent
about the past. The anti-fascist left wing movement allowed Germans to view themselves
through a different lens by utilizing American actions in the Vietnam War as a mirror to
their own history. Protesting perceived fascism and imperialism also allowed West
Germans to face their own guilt about being silent during Nazi rule. They even were able
to see what a smaller group might achieve through sustained protest when the
government added an article protecting civilian rights in the middle of an emergency
law.40
The 1970s in West Germany saw a new series of domestic protests emerge
against the FRG’s construction of nuclear reactors that allowed West Germany’s peace
movements to mature and led to the creation of the Green Party. Large anti-nuclear
protests throughout the seventies became the focus for violent clashes between the police
and the protestors. Militant urban left-wingers hijacked the anti-nuclear movements and
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created a feeling of civil war between the German police and the protestors, but violence
only served to undermine the cause. The confrontational strategies did not mesh well with
the pacifist stance that most Germans had taken since World War II and so the 1970s
anti-nuclear movement sought to distance itself from radical groups and the German
peace movements entered politics for the first time with the founding of the Green
Party.41
The anti-nuclear movement of the 1970s served to encourage more middle class
German citizens to support protests,. Nazism had destroyed many of the structures of
middle class sociability and also much of the confidence of the German middle class. The
movement started as a series of spontaneous events in the form of local siting disputes,
where locals were resisting the establishment of nuclear sites near their towns, which
aroused public concern about the risks of nuclear power and established the right to
resist. Due to the expansion of nuclear programs in 1974 and 1975, political action turned
from specific siting decisions, which were localized disputes over nuclear constructions
sites, to national nuclear policy, and the discourse turned from environmental
preservation to more apocalyptic themes.
The second stage in the evolution of protest was marked with disruptive
confrontation. Activists sought to prevent the construction of nuclear power plants and
were driven by moral fervor to protect justice, democracy, and human life. The mood and
tactics of the second phase left little room for negotiation and aggressive confrontation
with the government was almost inevitable. The confrontation provoked a very quick
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response from public authorities. Apparently, public authorities were willing to accept
protest so long as it did not threaten crucial policy decisions. Occupations at Wyhl,
Brokdorf, Grohnde, and Kalkar pushed these limits and the government moved to
mobilize police forces. Media attention had been initially supportive of the antinuclear
movement, but started focusing on the violence and potential infiltration of the movement
by left radicals and professional troublemakers. The backlash from violent confrontations
weakened the movement and created difficulties in mobilizing public support despite
some successes in preventing nuclear reactors from being built. After several dramatic
confrontations the movement entered a third stage. Protestors started exploring more
diverse strategies, such as conventional political participation and nonviolent actions.
The anti-nuclear movement had generally viewed the West German state as more
of a coercive apparatus than as a source of opportunity. Therefore, along with the internal
divisions over the use of violence, moderate and radical factions in the movement found
themselves excluded from the institutional body of politics. William Gamson, a professor
of sociology at Boston College, writes that the movement itself failed to be accepted as a
legitimate player, but that many of its goals were fulfilled by institutional actors. 42
Gamson meant that compared to the more pluralist approach to parties in the United
States, the German political process tends to more firmly institutionalize particular group
elements. A greater variety of splinter groups have the chance to be recognized as actual
parties and have an impact on politics.
The anti-nuclear movement seized an opportunity to create its own political party
and greater opposition in the West German government to nuclear power led to the
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creation of the Green Party in 1980. Instead of a single issue orientation favored by the
conservatives, the Greens decided to embrace a broader program which included labor,
foreign policy, minority, and gender issues. Over the next several years the goals of the
greater moderate anti-nuclear movement ran parallel to the efforts of the Green Party.
Non-violence made each group a natural ally of the other. The militant Left outright
rejected the Greens because “electoral participation weakens practical resistance.”43
Above all, political participation meant accepting the rules of the political process, which
was out of the question for the radical movement groups. The question of violence
lastingly separated the radical movement wing from the Green Party, which held firmly
to the principle of strict nonviolence. By contrast, the radical movement groups
propagated the calculated use of violence and thus had to consider the rise of the Green
Party as more of a step back.44
The American led decision for NATO to station nuclear weapons across Western
Europe re-galvanized the German peace movement in the early 1980s. Washington took a
double-track decision in December 1979 and offered its rival military bloc, the Warsaw
Pact, a mutual limitation of medium-range and intermediate-range ballistic missiles,
combined with the threat that in case of disagreement NATO would deploy more middle
range nuclear weapons in Western Europe. Following the NATO decision to station 572
nuclear warheads, thousands of nuclear munitions were deployed on West German
territory alone targeting cities and civil and military facilities across the Soviet Union and
Eastern Europe. At the same time, West German territory itself became a major target of
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the Soviet SS-20 missiles, of which some were stationed in East Germany. In the years
that followed, protestors organized human chains, sit-ins, and mass demonstrations that
drew hundreds of thousands of West German citizens who regularly protested against
NATO and the deployment of United States nuclear weapons in the country. German
anti-war songs, like “99 Red Balloons,” became very popular on an international level.
The translated lyrics, “99 War ministers…called for war and wanted power. Man, who
would have guessed that!” speak to the suspicions that many Germans and others around
the world felt towards their governments in the 1980s.45 The installation of the Pershing
II and cruise missiles in 1983 deflated the peace movement. Attendance at meetings and
marches dropped significantly and resignation set in as people lost their belief that extra
parliamentary action could change security policy. In the late eighties, the movement did
technically achieve its goals as global arms control agreements were signed in rapid
order. America and the Soviet Union agreed to eliminate all Soviet and American
medium range missiles in Europe. The INF treaty, signed in December 1987, eliminated
the missiles that peace movement had been fighting against anyway. Even though the
West German peace movement had not achieved its goals the thawing of the Cold War
rekindled faith in arms control and international diplomacy. The German public
continued to believe that international conflicts could be resolved via diplomacy.46
East of the “Iron Curtain,” peace movements finally began to gain momentum in
the 1980s as well. Large organized protest movements had become relatively common in
West German, but were virtually non-existent in East Germany. Tighter government
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control and Soviet oversight harshly penalized any organized dissidents. In the early
1980s, a movement began that was led by religious organizations. A group of young
people met at the Dresden Frauenkirche in 1982 to protest war, violence, and East
German militarization. The East Germans sought disarmament and took on the slogan
“Swords into Plowshares” as their motto. They gained momentum over the next several
years in 1989 the “Peaceful Revolution” occurred. Opposition groups formed across East
Germany and protested the government’s policies and the increase of East German
militarization. Mass demonstration led to a loss of power for the dictatorship in East
Germany and without Soviet Support the border between East and West Germany reopened. On November 9, the East German Politburo allowed East Berliners to travel to
the West side of the city and that night the Berlin Wall was torn down and Germany took
a big step towards re-unification.47
The fall of the Wall and German re-unification signaled the end of the Cold War
and changed both the world and Germany. At the time of the German re-unification in
October 1990, Germany followed a policy of strict military abstinence in conflicts
outside of Europe. The notion that the Bundeswehr could be used for other purposes than
defense of Germany was inconceivable across the political spectrum. Germany’s peace
movements had spent several decades pushing for greater awareness and acceptance of
collective war memories and guilt of the Second World War and did not want Germany
to fall back into the vicious cycle of militarization. Each anti-war protest movement had
subsequently built upon the previous movement and Germans, especially West Germans,
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had established a system for pushing against government policies that they did not like.
The end of the Cold War and German re-unification meant that Germany’s antimilitarism would be put to the test as Germany’s allies began to look to her as an ally in
conflicts abroad. The late nineties would see Germany send troops outside of German
borders for the first time since the Second World War. When the terrorist attacks on
September 11, 2001 occurred, the German public found themselves caught in a quandary
between the pacifist ideals they had spent decades fighting for and the international
political position that a re-unified Germany now found itself occupying. Troop
deployment to Afghanistan would serve as the issue that would bring Germany’s peace
movements into conflict with a German government that believed Germany had military
responsibilities to the world and had tied itself politically to its western allies.
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Foreign Policy Development in Post-World War II Germany
German foreign policy made headlines in the United States in late 2002 as
Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder made his opposition to American plans to launch a
preventative war against Iraq the centerpiece of his campaign. Schroeder’s campaign
slogan, “the German way,” sounded awfully similar to Sonderweg (special path) or
Alleingang (going it alone), something Germans had been trying to avoid for the past 50
years, and seemed to point to a changed and more assertive Germany.48 Had the Cold
War era merely been a break in German policy, a short period of inactivity forced by
German division and the loss of World War II? Was Germany moving back into a
position of using power politics and pursuing its interests in Europe with confidence and
a desire for power?
Fears about a new and assertive Germany were not necessarily misplaced as
Germany was rapidly becoming a big power in Europe again, but the German Way
continued to be influenced by multilateralism, cooperative institution building,
skepticism of using military power to achieve ends, and an emphasis on human rights and
international laws. Germany remained very much influenced by its ties developed to the
West during the post-World War II years and the quest for sovereignty and protection
during the Cold War. West Germany’s government began searching for a new identity
after World War II that would make Germany relevant as a political power, and aiding
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the United States in the war against terrorism in Afghanistan was a natural continuation
of policy developed during the Cold War.
After World War II, West Germany underwent a complete transformation in how
it confronted the world after the devastating defeat it suffered. Germany’s role in the
world had been defined by its military. Journalist and historian William Shirer moved
with the German troops during World War II and observed that Germans were willing
misled by their government and that certain culturally shared beliefs and understandings
about war and violence were used by the Nazis to gain support for a conflict that nearly
destroyed Germany’s ability to exist as a nation-state.49 These beliefs, love for the
fatherland, fear of Bolshevism, disgust for the Versailles Treaty, desire for a German
“place in the sun,” and distrust of non-Germans, were built on traditional beliefs that war
could be honorable, virtuous, and sometimes necessary. Hitler used rhetoric and
propaganda to twist these cultural attributes into a fascist ideology that allowed for the
construction of a brutal, war-making regime. By 1945 all of those beliefs and ideals had
been destroyed.
The next three and a half decades after the war saw West Germans develop a
foreign policy that allowed them to face their war guilt and achieve acceptance in the
international system. West Germany was not a “normal” state, due to its history, but the
first postwar political generation wanted West Germany to become a state with equal
rights by rejecting the kind of behavior that had led to two major wars in the first fifty
years of the century. Germans would have to reject the type of foreign policy thinking
that had been dominant since the establishment of the German empire in 1871. Germany
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looked to create links to the West (Westpolitik) and the East (Ostpolitik). Through
Westpolitik, West Germany would integrate itself into western institutions and define
itself as part of a western alliance, a process known as Westbindung or Einbindung.
Through Ostpolitik, successive West German governments would seek to cultivate better
relations with East Germany and the Soviet Union in order to minimize tension and deal
with the reality of German division.50
In 1949, when the American, French, and British zones were united to form the
Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), the Allies severely limited the political power of
the new West German state. Normal rights of sovereignty, such as raising an army,
developing an independent foreign policy, and control over internal affairs, were
curtailed or nonexistent. Under these circumstances, Konrad Adenauer led the Christian
Democratic Union (CDU) controlled coalition into government in 1949. For Adenauer’s
government, the postwar years were a struggle to regain sovereignty and achieve equality
in the international system. By proving Germany a stable and trustworthy ally, Adenauer
hoped to persuade the United States to pressure other European states to remove most of
the restraints imposed on Germany after the war. In order to do that, Germans would
have to adapt to what was expected of them in the U.S. led system. Coming from the
western part of Germany, Adenauer considered the cause of Germany’s past problems to
have been insufficient integration into the Western way of life and a lack of democratic
ideals. The Germans, he believed, had a “false sense of the state, power, and the role of
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the individual.”51 He placed reunification goals as second to attaining a more influential
place in the international system for the new state.52
Adenauer’s approach was termed Westpolitik, which meant that Germany would
integrate into the Western system of political thought and institutions. As early as 1949,
Adenauer suggested that Germany could re-arm to counter Soviet aggression. He was not
seeking to return to previous German militarization, but firmly believed that no state
could be a sovereign or equal member of the international system without a military. The
Social Democratic Party (SPD), led by Kurt Schumacher, believed that West Germany
should not have to submit to the demands of any outside powers. Their goal was to reestablish the Reich based upon democracy and freedom. Schumacher desired a neutral
and unified Germany with the power to defend itself.53
Adenauer’s policies won out because of his control over the German government
and he wasted no time in trying to develop a web of relationships that would legitimize
the German state. He realized that one of the major tasks facing Germany was the effort
to rebuild the economy and convincing Germans that Western democracy could work.
The other pressing issue was convincing the other European states that the new West
Germany was not a threat, and in fact could be a partner. Germany began cooperating
with France to integrate into the European system. Adenauer saw German integration as a
way to establish legitimacy and become a player in the postwar system. West Germany
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even rejected offers of peace talks from the Russians and became even more firmly
entrenched in the western system.54
The Korean War broke out in 1950 and policy makers in the United States
became convinced that German re-armament was a necessity. Adenauer saw re-armament
as a means to regain West German sovereignty, but many West Germans were not
convinced that re-armament was a good idea. Despite significant opposition from both
Germans and the French, West German re-armament was approved on November 12,
1955. Germany joined NATO and promised not to use its military to try and reunify the
country. The new military was called the Bundeswehr and the constitution of West
Germany was changed to accommodate re-armament for homeland defense and later to
authorize conscription. The SPD was worried that rearmament would lead to an
antidemocratic military and there was a public outcry against the idea of a new German
military so soon after the war’s end.55 West Germany’s minister of internal affairs,
Gustav Heinemann, even resigned in 1950 as a protest to Adenauer’s plans. Erich
Ollenhauer and other SPD members claimed that rearmament was unconstitutional, but
Adenauer argued that only a war of aggression and not a defensive war would violate the
constitution. Article 87 clearly states that the Bundeswehr could be deployed as a defense
force in emergencies, but that further use would need parliamentary approval. To prevent
a resurgence of traditional militarism, the new German army was planned to be “citizens
in uniform” rather than a professional army. German soldiers would no longer be a
separate clique with special privileges. Soldiers were asked to understand politics,
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question orders they saw as immoral, and have all of their democratic rights intact even
within the military structure.56
Adenauer pushed his policies through regardless of public opposition to
militarization.57 He had very strong control over the government and the incredible
growth of the German economy served overcome much of the opposition to his policies.
Adenauer believed that if Germany were to be part of the Western system and reap its
rewards, it had to accept military responsibility and embrace the Cold War. In the 1950s,
this dissonance between public opinion and foreign policy could be brushed aside rather
easily. Besides the old knowledge that the new German military was very different from
the old, Germany wedded its military to the NATO alliance, and the American strategy of
massive retaliation meant that it would be hard to imagine German soldiers actually
fighting. Germans had the luxury of being able to have a military that they did not need to
seriously think about and they could speak of in terms of using it only for their selfdefense as their partners were taking care of security interests and other Cold War
confrontations. German rearmament occurred despite antimilitarism in the population and
by 1963 the Bundeswehr had grown to over 400,000 troops. West Germany managed to
gain more international equality by rejecting pure antimilitarism despite re-arming,58
The deployment of American nuclear weapons on German soil was pushed
through in spite of massive popular protests. Invoking the past with terms such as
“nuclear holocaust” the peace movement attempted to establish a link between the new
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NATO defense doctrine and the cruel effectiveness of the Nazi extermination camps.
Adenauer responded by pointing to the consequences of the Western appeasement of
Hitler’s territorial claims in Eastern Europe and stating that totalitarian states could only
be negotiated with from a position of strength. In order to regain public support, the West
German government designed a policy that combined Western military solidarity with an
attempt to promote détente and negotiations with the East. In a government resolution of
March 1958, the superpowers were urged to enter into general disarmament talks. With
the Harmel report of 196759, the dual pillars of defense and negotiation were adopted as
official NATO strategy to the great satisfaction of the German mainstream.60
From 1966-69, the Grand Coalition of the CDU and the SPD governed and
continued to work towards better communication with the East. The Grand Coalition was
forced to face the student protests taking place during the late sixties against West
Germany’s support of American foreign policy and also against the Emergency Laws that
the government sought to pass. The laws basically stated that the government had the
right to curb certain civilian freedoms, like introducing curfews, during a national crisis.
Almost every other nation had a similar law that afforded governments even greater
powers, but Germans envisioned the return of the Nazis. Despite vigorous student
protests the Grand Coalition stood firm in its support of the Emergency Laws and
continued to debate and defend them.
The bill was preceded by almost ten years of public debate on this issue
and more than a yearlong discussion of the proposal by the federal
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government…I would dare claim that this house has rarely been as well
prepared to debate and make a decision on a draft presented to it…It is
not true that this draft paves the way to dictatorship…It is not true that
this draft will do away with civil liberties. Freedom of opinion, freedom
of the press, freedom of assembly and association will not be affected by
it.61

Knowing that the emergency laws were the only way to achieve complete independence
from the Allied control over West German policies; the bill was passed by the Federal
Republic of Germany on May 30, 1968. The days previous to the bill passing were filled
with thousands of students demonstrating against the bill, but the demonstrators began to
splinter after they had been defeated. The students had received broad support from a
large segment of the German population, but the confrontational methods used by the
protestors tended limit other West Germans from joining the protests. 62 Once again, the
German government pushed through an unpopular policy because it believed that the
policy was necessary for the good of the country.
Willy Brandt became chancellor of West Germany in 1969 and focused on
Ostpolitik as the major cornerstone of his foreign policy. He tried to build links between
East and West Germany and in doing so soften the border. He believed that Germany
could be re-unified through open discussion. Brandt also tied his foreign policy into a
broader agenda of how to deal with Germany’s past. Public reflection on the darker sides
of German history became a part of his trust building strategy towards the East. In a
series of acts of atonement and reconciliation, German political memory was extended
back to the Nazi invasion of Poland in 1939 and the Soviet Union in 1941. His bent knee
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at the memorial to Jews killed in the Warsaw ghetto was a powerfully symbolic gesture
and an essential component of his diplomatic strategy. It signaled that Germany was not a
revisionist power looking to regain lost territory in the East.
Under the motto “daring more democracy, Brandt linked his policy towards the
East and the past to a domestic agenda that tapped into the sentiments fueling the student
movement of 1968. He criticized elements of Adenauer’s rearmament and rearmament
policy. The “1968ers” fought for democratization of German politics as well as the
demilitarization of international relations. Against the backdrop of the American war in
Vietnam, the peace movement from the 1950s had been reinvigorated as the rallied
against capitalist power politics and the use of force in international relations.
Brandt’s new security policy thinking and approach to the East rested on a belief
in ‘soft’ power, such as the potential of economic, political, and cultural instruments of
foreign policy. Even though governments might be at odds, societies and people shared
common interests. Willy Brandt’s foreign policy continued to affect German thought
about how foreign and security policy could be carried out until the present day. A
number of peace research institutes popped up in Germany during the 1970s as academia
was influenced by foreign policy. They focused on topics such as socialization and
aggression, the arms race, and how images of enemies were used. West Germany
continued to seek West and European integration as a part its foreign policy. Both
Westpolitik and Ostpolitik required cooperation and integration as a means to pursue
security, prosperity, and in the long run, unity. However, West Germany would remain in
the middle of the Cold War and even after reunification would continue to be pulled in
directions that the public did not want to go by allies. By tying itself so strongly to NATO
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and Europe, Germany would be forced to make some very difficult decisions between the
1980s and the war in Afghanistan that created conflict between the government and
public opinion. The German government was striving to make decisions and policies that
would benefit Germany, but those decisions were often not in alignment with the
sentiments of the German public.63
When Helmut Schmidt entered office in 1974, he shifted the focus of foreign
policy and downplayed Ostpolitik while emphasizing the importance of superpower
détente. Normalizing relations with the East allowed Germany to maintain its adherence
to the Western alliance even when many Germans feared that the United States would be
too quick to draw Europe into a war that would destroy Germany. Part of this effort was
domestic, convincing a skeptical public that they were working to make sure that the
feared war would never happen. Social scientist Professor Scott Erb writes that the path
of multilateralism and institutional cooperation provided Germany with a means to
balance potential international contradictions. The emergence of these values as a part of
German foreign policy seemed to take place in the 1960s and 1970s. What began as a
strategy to achieve German interests in a world where Germany was divided and needed
allied approval for most initiatives became an ingrained and expected approach for most
Germans. Armed force began to seem unnecessary as Germany managed to establish
respect and achieve goals without resorting to military force.64
Schmidt’s superpower détente strategy led to him promoting the idea for the dual
track decision near the end of the 1970s. He proposed that NATO negotiate with the
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Soviets to have their new SS-20 missile system removed, but that NATO be prepared to
install Pershing II and cruise missiles as a balance should the negotiations be
unsuccessful. The reaction in Germany was an outpouring of anti-military feelings that
surpassed even the debate over rearmament. Massive protests and arguments within the
government undermined the leadership of Helmut Schmidt. He was replaced by Helmut
Kohl in 1982, who immediately proclaimed that the double track decision would continue
despite popular German protest. Even though protests against the double track decision
were on a far larger scale than the later protests against the war in Afghanistan and the
Iraq War, the West German government was able to generally push aside any opposition.
The government tried to dissuade protesters in 1982 and 1983 by arresting them en-masse
and fining them hundreds of marks when they did things such as block United States
bases. Some estimates from the summer of 1983 showed that approximately three million
people were active in the peace movement and polls showed that Germans opposed the
stationing of missiles by a margin of 70-30.65
The Kohl government responded to critics of the missile deployment by arguing
that it was impossible for Germany to refuse to deploy the missiles without betraying the
alliance. Kohl appealed to NATO loyalty and Western values, as well as the importance
of deterring the Soviet Union. By doing so, he expressed the logic that defined German
foreign policy, that of institutionalism, multilateralism, and identification with Western
values. Germany was a part of an institution that entailed responsibilities to the alliance
partners. These were not just matters of self-interest, but also matters of international
importance. The disarmament negotiations remained inconclusive and when West
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Germany agreed to allow missile deployment, Russia aborted the negotiations.

On

November 22, 1983, the Bundestag approved the missile deployment and as soon as the
missiles were installed as planned, support for the peace movement disappeared. 66 Kohl
effectively disarmed the Peace Movement by mixing acceptance of the missiles with a
continuation of Ostpolitik, basically rejecting the United States emphasis on
confrontation. Danish historian David Gress writes that the lack of resiliency in the
German peace movement reflects the fact that the movement itself was driven by a fear
that Germany was supporting the kind of Cold War policies that the Reagan
administration was pursuing. Once it became clear that Germany would not be following
Reagan style policies the depth of the opposition to missile deployment evaporated.
While the missile issue exposed the contradiction between German policy goals and
cultural attitudes toward military conflict, the policy of Ostpolitik continued to assuage
German fears of a potential conflict.
The 1980s represented another moment in German history where public opinion
and foreign policy did not match up at all. However, the German government continued
to find success in pushing aside concerns and passing unpopular policy. Probably a big
reason for the lack of governmental concern with public opinion was the Cold War, but
also the strong ties to NATO and the West. Kohl’s government, just like preceding and
succeeding German governments, continued to approve policies that they felt would keep
Germany safe and also strengthen Germany’s presence in Europe. Military might was
viewed as a necessary tool and relationships with the West, especially the United States,
would serve to influence German foreign policy until the 2003 invasion of Iraq.
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The 1980s ended with the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the reunification of
Germany. Newly reunited Germany was thrust onto the world stage like never before and
the course of German foreign policy would be affected by new circumstances. NATO and
the United States decided that a free sovereign Germany was a welcome within the
alliance and so East Germans were brought into the Western fold. The East German
foreign minister, Markus Eckel, advocated that Germany withdraw from NATO and
demilitarize, but Chancellor Helmut Kohl strongly objected and instead that Germany
remain a NATO member and maintain its military. Even though West Germany was not
seeking military conflict, it had become used to being allied with the West and expected
to at least have some form of military. The unification treaty was officially signed in
1990 and Germany regained its full sovereignty.67
At the time of German re-unification Germany was still following a strict policy
of military abstinence in conflicts outside of Europe. The notion that the Bundeswehr
could be used for a purpose other than defense seemed unimaginable to many Germans. 68
Much would change leading up to the war in Afghanistan. New international
responsibilities coupled with several crises in Europe and the Middle East pushed
Germany to deploy its military outside of German borders despite public disapproval.
During the 1990s the government would continue to develop arguments to gain public
support for military deployment, but those arguments would begin to fall flat by the time
Germany entered Afghanistan. Between 1990 and 1994, the big issues in the domestic
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German battle regarding military use were the requirements of partnership and the
lessons of Germany’s past. The fault line ran between the political center right and the
left. The former argued that the expectations of Germany’s partners towards the bigger
and more secure Germany as well as the lessons of Germany’s history called for an
extended German engagement in international security and the latter claimed the
opposite. Several factors served to fuel the domestic debate. First, increased international
pressure for a German contribution to multinational peace missions made it possible to
harness the sentiments condensed in “never again alone.” Second, the First Gulf War and
the breakup of Yugoslavia indicated the limits of unarmed diplomacy in managing the
crises of the new era and protecting innocent civilian lives. These new crises threw into
doubt the belief in a policy that simultaneously committed Germany to Western
integration, a maximum restraint in military matters, and to values such as democracy,
international law, and human rights.
Even though Germany was finally removed as the world’s geopolitical strategic
center with the end of the Cold War, its policy makers did have much time to rest.
Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait in August 1990 placed the question of Germany’s new
role in international security on the agenda before the negotiations on German unity were
even finished. Key German schools of thought, “never again alone” and “never again
war,” were thrown into conflict with each other. As all of Germany’s major partners
rallied behind the United States in the Gulf, only German government bent over
backwards to support the effort without appearing to do so and hundreds of thousands of
Germans took to the streets to protest the war. Eventually, the allied forces were forced to
make do without German troops. Trying to compromise historical opposition to fighting
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and the desire to show solidarity, the German government extended material and
financial help to the United States led coalition while declining any direct military
involvement. Besides covering a substantial part of the costs of Operation Desert Storm
and aiding countries indirectly hurt by the conflict, Germany permitted American and
British armed forces unrestricted use of their German bases and installations, supported
the movement of American and British troops to the Gulf, and supplied several
ammunition shipments to the international coalition.69
The absence of German troops in the international coalition made Germany the
target of criticism and accusation of security free-riding and risk avoidance from both its
European allies and the United States. The Gulf Conflict served to modify the thinking of
the German government in regards to military actions outside of Germany. Conservative
proponents of out-of-area engagements were able to gain the ear of the party mainstream,
arguing that Germany’s standing and influence as a partner in Europe and NATO was
threatened by the policy f strict military abstinence. “Never again alone” became a
successful motivator in attempting to change minds on the military debate. The CDU
announced in late 1990 that they would start working on a plan to create clarification of
the German constitution to enable the Bundeswehr to “participate in actions agreed upon
by the Security Council within the framework of the UN Charter.” 70 The Gulf Conflict
also modified the position of the German Liberals. The crisis had mounted an intellectual
challenge on the belief in international cooperation and pacifist conflict resolution.
Diplomatic efforts had failed during the Gulf War and the Liberals had been caught
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unprepared for that. However, the Liberals still maintained a strong aversion to the use of
military force and the German public was generally still opposed to military involvement
as well.71 Arguments for Bundeswehr deployment began to surface in the government
and would continue to be used over the next decade. Two suggestions were brought forth
by Helmut Kohl and other members of the CDU, concerning Germany’s responsibility to
its past and that its partners needed Germany’s engagement. These suggestions grew into
arguments that proved effective when Germany sent troops to Kosovo, but were less than
ideal for the war in Afghanistan when the German people decided that troop deployment
was unnecessary.
Germany’s first out-of-area engagement occurred during the breakup of
Yugoslavia and the ensuing war in Serbia and Montenegro. The German government
decided to contribute Bundeswehr units to monitor a sea and air embargo against Serbia
and Montenegro (Operation Sharp Guard) and to enforce a no-fly zone over Bosnia.
From July 1992 to June 1996, Germany contributed with three sea-surveillance aircraft
and two destroyers to patrol the shores of Montenegro and Albania. The opposition to
military deployment expressed concerns over the re-militarization of German policy. The
government pushed ahead with the deployment and the SPD lodged a complaint with
Germany’s Constitutional Court. The German contribution to Operation Sharp Guard did
not qualify as a humanitarian mission, it was argued, and therefore violated the German
constitution’s Article 87. The constitution emphasized the use of the German military as a
defense force and Foreign Minister Hans Dieter Genscher declared to the Bundestag on
August 23, 1990 that he believed the military deployment of troops outside of German
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controlled territory to be illegal. The main case asked the Court to determine where the
deployment of Bundeswehr units outside of the NATO area violated German Basic Law
and was not decided until 1994. Initially in 1993, the Court decided that German troops
could stay in Yugoslavia because the political consequences of withdrawal would be far
more detrimental to Germany’s relationship with its allies than maintaining a troop
presence. The main reason appeared to be “never again alone” instead of “never again
war.”72
The arguments for German military participation outside of German borders
finally gained some traction with a larger German audience. Pointing to Germany’s
historical experience and invoking one of the most powerful symbols in German political
history, the Nazi extermination camps, the government argued that military measures
were sometimes necessary to stop an aggressor and end large scale human rights
violations. Defense Minister Volker Ruehe stated that “The concentration camps in
Germany were shut down by soldiers and not by diplomatic declarations! Again, in the
future it may be possible to stop the deepest immorality only by using soldiers. In such
cases the deployment of military means is required on moral grounds.”73 Appealing to the
ingrained urge to avoid being without allies again, and fears over losing influence with
NATO and European allies, the government also argued that Germany’s international
standing and credibility as a partner and as a responsible member of the international
community was at stake. As long as German armed forces had to hold the central Cold
War front in Europe they were exempted from wider global responsibilities, but the
bigger and safer re-unified Germany had an obligation to support international efforts to
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safeguard peace and stability in line with the other Western democracies. Against this
backdrop, proponents of an extended German role in international security could present
a German contribution to manage the Balkan crisis as a precondition for further European
political integration. “How exactly do you imagine you can build Europe if the German
ships as a matter of principle take a course that differs from the ships of all our allies?,”
Volker Ruehe asked in the face of opposition to Operation Sea Guard.74 Germans began
to acknowledge that perhaps military intervention might represent the only way to protect
civilian lives. “As a very last resort, when all other means have failed, when there is no
other way of protecting defenseless people, it might be the case that the dispatch of UN
soldiers is necessary,” said Gerd Poppe of the Green Party.75
On July 12, 1994 the German Constitutional Court handed down a final decision
on the out-of-area question and opened up the path for further military deployments
outside of Germany. The Court ruled that the deployment of German troops in military
operations outside of NATO area was constitutional, provided they formed part of a
multilateral operation designed to uphold international peace and security, carried out by
an organization of collective security such as NATO or the UN. The German Bundestag
would need to approve each individual deployment with a simple majority. The 1994
ruling approved a policy that broke with practice of the previous fifty years. Yet, no
major political debate arose after the decision was handed down. The center right simply
greeted the result as a victory for the policy of international solidarity and responsibility.
The Social Democratic leaders offered statements about international responsibility and
the need for Germany to contribute to all out-of-area missions covered by the UN charter.
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However, no discussion took place regarding how potential out-of-area interventions
might serve Germany’s interest. Multinational frameworks that would best serve German
national interest were not debated and no one talked about what the geographical and
military limits of Germany’s participation would be. Memories of Germany’s past did
lead to an emphasis on Germany remaining a “civilian” instead of a military power and
continuing to resolve international crises through diplomacy instead of military force.
Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel stressed that Germany would never act alone and would
consider military measures only in missions where they formed part of a broader
approach aiming at lasting political solutions in the conflict.76
In early July, 1995, Serbian security forces overran the “safe” area of Srebrenica
and proceeded to kill over 8000 Muslims who had sought refuge there. The UN
peacekeeping troops in the area were confined to their compound and made no move to
prevent the genocide. Srebrenica left German pacifists speechless. Diplomatic means and
economic sanctions had done nothing to prevent the biggest single mass murder in
postwar European history. The potential price of pacifism and the inner contradiction
between humanism and principled military abstention was exposed in a shocking manner.
The shock of Srebrenica caused much consternation and soul searching on the German
Left. The motto “never again Auschwitz” overcame “never again war” as Germans
decided that perhaps military intervention was now necessary. Germany proceeded to
contribute several thousand troops and equipment, like military aircraft, to the
international peacekeeping forces in Yugoslavia. When violence escalated in Kosovo in
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1998, Germany took the final step towards full participation in international crisis
management.77
The 1998 election in Germany constituted a power change in the German
government as Gerhard Schroeder78 of the SPD became chancellor and the powerful
CDU party lost the election. The SPD formed a coalition with the Green Party and
Joschka Fischer79 became the new Foreign Minister. The Red-Green Coalition
represented the left side of the German government and had been a proponent for peace,
but Schroeder and Fischer would oversee Germany’s military and peacekeeping
expansion. The Schroeder administration pledged Germany’s support of NATO airstrikes
in Kosovo and Fischer of the Green Party reiterated the “never again Auschwitz”
philosophy that pushed him and other pacifists to support military actions.80
Between the Second World War and the Kosovo Crisis, Germany had moved
from abstaining entirely from military deployment to being a willing international partner
in crisis management and peacekeeping. The German government since 1949 had
repeatedly preached that Germany needed a military to have sovereignty and be respected
as a leader internationally and regionally. The Cold War limited the scope of Germany’s
international cooperation as Germans focused mainly on potential war with the Soviet
Union and East Germany, but served to tie Germany tightly with the West. German

77

Richard Holbrooke, To End a War (Modern Library, 1999), 69-70.
Schroeder was a German politician who emerged as a leader of the SPD. He organized protests against
the United States and the deployment of NATO missiles in Germany and even embraced Marxism. He won
a Bundestag seat in 1980 and worked his way towards eventually becoming chancellor.
79
Fischer had been a leading figure for the West German Greens since the 1970s and was arguably
Germany’s most popular politician for most of time in the government. He participated in the 1968
student protests. Domestic terrorist acts in the 1970s shocked him to the point where he renounced
violence and became a pacifist and a founding member of the Green Party.
80
Hockenos, 261.
78

61

reunification put Germany on the world stage and generated requests from allied nations
for military support. The German government began to develop several arguments that
supported and justified military intervention as a part of foreign policy and countered the
antiwar taboos of a generally pacifist German public. Importance was placed on
maintaining good relationships with allies since Germany desired to be “never again
alone.” Emphasis was also placed on humanitarian aid as Germany sought to fulfill
multilateral responsibilities and rectify past mistakes, and preventing anything like the
horrors of Nazi Germany from happening again.
The war in Afghanistan would demonstrate that the German public was not
willing to join a war simply because the government made these arguments. Antiwar
taboos still ran strong and the German government tried to overcome these even while
trying to fulfill international obligations to allies. Germany’s postwar history was a story
of the German government attempting to regain German pride and doing what they
considered in the country’s best interests while coming up against peace protests who
feared remilitarization and a return to Nazism or prewar Germany. The attacks against the
World Trade Center on September 11, 2001 would rekindle the discussion on German
military deployment and lead to an eventual rejection of the Second Gulf War.
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Afghanistan: German Domestic Dispute over Troop Deployment
The German government chose to send troops to Afghanistan late in 2001 in
response to terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and United States requests for
international support. Early German public opinion on the war in Afghanistan was
relatively divided. Many Germans seemed to feel that something should be done about
Afghanistan and terrorist activity, but did not believe that German military involvement
should the first course of action. Various factors explaining the steady decline in public
approval over the next two years can be determined by looking at German pacifist ideals
and concerns for how the United States was conducting the war. Other factors include
German concern over casualties, concerns for the future of Afghanistan, and the fact that
many Germans felt that the situation in Afghanistan was not truly a humanitarian crisis
and did not actually require German Bundeswehr involvement.
The German domestic debate over whether Germany should deploy troops outside
of German borders came to a head in between September, 2001 and April, 2004 as the
German government attempted to justify troop deployment to Afghanistan and potential
deployment to Iraq. Initial success in convincing the German public to support military
action soon ran into difficulties as German collective memory and cultural taboos
informed a public negative response to Germany’s military deployment in the Middle
East. The debate surrounding Afghanistan was largely influenced by Germany’s strong
pacifist tendencies that had been developed after World War Two in response to the
militarism inherent within the Nazi regime, as well as the peace movements that had been
discussed in the previous two chapters.
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On September 19, 2001, only eight days after the September 11 attacks on the
World Trade Center, German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder addressed the Bundestag
with a call for action. He declared that the attacks represented not just war with the
United States, but also with the “civilized”81 world. Schroeder pointed out that many
feared a “war of the cultures,” but also stated out that the world was growing smaller and
that Germany needed to respect other cultures around the world. The chancellor said that
terrorism was the real threat which was directed against “everything that our world holds
most dear, like the human life, human honor, and the values of freedom, tolerance, and
democracy.”82 Schroeder wanted to emphasize that Germany was not looking to fight
Afghanistan, but wanted to defeat terrorism. He quoted the American Declaration of
Independence: “We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal,
that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these
are Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness,” and stated that nothing in these ideals
contradicted Islamist teachings. Schroeder declared that “Germany stands at the side of
the United States of America in the face of these unprecedented attacks!” He went on to
say that “our acknowledgement of our political and moral solidarity with the United
States is these days more than just a self-evident truth.”83
Schroeder went on to remind Germans that the time for action was probably near.
“We don’t know yet what support the United States will require from its NATO partners.
It could include military support; that’s a possibility that cannot be ignored and therefore
I will not rule it out…We, as Germans and Europeans, should be willing to offer
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unrestrained solidarity with the United States…even militarily.”84 Schroeder’s call for
potential action was designed to remind Germans that they stood for the higher cause of
defending civilization from terrorism and that action needed to be taken against terrorists
who were threatening civilized nations around the world. Schroeder thanked the United
States’ contribution to German freedom and liberty, but stated that other reasons existed
for Germany to aid the United States’ war effort in Afghanistan. He said that,
“Thankfulness is an important and weighty category. However, it is not enough to
legitimize existential decisions which stand before us. We need to let one thing guide our
decisions, our Nation’s future competency to protect itself in a free world.” Germany
needed to demonstrate that they were capable of protecting their own borders and
simultaneously working together with other nations to eliminate international threats. The
Security Council of the United Nations established in Resolution 1368 that the terror
attacks on New York and Washington were threats to world peace and international
security. Schroeder believed that the Security Council’s resolution provided legitimacy
for many Germans to the idea of planning a war on terrorism in Afghanistan, because
most Germans were more comfortable deploying troops abroad under the umbrella of an
internationally sanctioned operation. He pointed out that actions taken by the United
States and their allies against aggressors, as defined by the United Nations and NATO,
were legitimate and completely legal.85
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Schroeder’s words received warm applause and vocal support from each political
party present at the Bundestag meeting.86 German politicians seemed to be caught up in
the shock and outrage which permeated much of the world after the September 11 attacks
and were willing to consider war with terrorist elements hidden in Afghanistan. They
even applauded when Schroeder reminded them that NATO had invoked Article V of the
Brussels Treaty87 which called for collective defense of an attacked allied nation.
Friederich Merz, the chairman for the Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social
Union88 and usually a political opponent of Schroeder, stood up to voice his support:
“September 11 has fundamentally changed the world. I want to put special emphasis on
the fact that we need to give the community of free peoples, our alliance, NATO, and
especially our friends in the United States of America a clear yes. This is not the time for
a yes, but.” 89
The initial reaction of most Germans seemed to be in line with the rest of Europe
and was characterized by shock and outrage. Peter Struck, the Bundestag majority leader
declared, “Today we are all Americans.”90 Josef Joffe, the publisher-editor of Die Zeit,
wrote that civilization was under attack.91 Joffe graphically wrote that “Uncounted are the
dead, the wounded. Just like in war the law of triage rules. The rescuers only help those
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that hang between life and death.” He outlined the horrors and concerns for world peace
and expressed fear about terrorism. The ashes of the World Trade Center represented a
new kind of war; Joffe called it a war of cultures. Joffe continued to say that Germany
needed to join in solidarity with the United States to prevent the breakdown of
civilization. “Terrorists do not place value on anything in their lives and civilized nations
need to show that their way of living has much value.92
On September 14, more than 200,000 Germans appeared at the Brandenburg Gate
in Berlin to demonstrate their rejection of the attacks and solidarity with the victims. In
general, German support of America was very high shortly after the terrorist attacks and
the outrage felt by most Europeans was very real.93 Many Germans were outraged
because a number of the hijackers had been trained in a terrorist cell in Hamburg.
Emotions were running high in Germany as people seemed to see the attacks in New
York as an assault against Western civilization. Speaking outside of the Brandenburg
Gate, the Bundestag majority leader Johannes Rau, declared that “America does not stand
alone!” Rau called upon memories of the Berlin Airlift as well as President John F.
Kennedy’s call for German friendship at a speech in 1961. “No one knows better than the
people of Berlin what America has done for freedom and democracy in Germany. We
would not be able to stand here at the Brandenburg Gate this evening had America not
supported us over many years and in difficult times.” Rau continued to articulate what
most Germans were feeling as he considered the horrible images coming out of America.
“As Germans our thoughts and our feelings also go out to America. We still have the
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dreadful pictures in our heads. We cannot get them out of our minds. We have become
witnesses to murderous acts of violence such as the world has never before experienced
outside times of war.”94
Germans extended a verbal pledge of solidarity with Americans and called for
cooperative action. Islamic radicalists were decried as murderers and many Germans
declared that they would stand against Islamic fanaticism that aimed to condemn entire
religions and cultures. Rau appealed to German humanitarian sensibilities at the
Brandenburg Gate rally by stating that “Whoever wants to truly overcome terrorism must
ensure through political action that the ground is cut from below the feet of the prophets
of violence. Poverty and exploitation, misery and lack of rights drive people to despair.”95
Rau called for Germans to combat terrorism and declared that they would defeat it. While
receiving applause from the gathered crowd he warned them that actions taken against
terrorism would be laborious and time consuming. Achieving peace and a just
international order would take time and money. Rau would prove to be prophetic, but his
speech was received with approval, based on polls expressing German support of the
United States’ plans for invading Afghanistan, and a desire to aid the United States
against a perceived terrorist threat.96 Over fifty percent of Germans believed that the
United States was justified in invading Afghanistan and that Germany could find nonmilitary ways of providing aid. Rau’s words may not have been a call for military
intervention, but were still a call for intervention. He wanted Germany to become
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involved in Afghanistan and to find a way for Germany to aid in eliminating the terrorist
threat.
Ten days after the attack, German parliament passed a resolution expressing full
solidarity with the United States, passing 611 out of 666 possible votes, with only the
PDS showing solid opposition.97 Despite being so far away from the site of the attacks,
fifty percent of Germans feared that a similar attack could happen in Germany and fiftyseven percent believed that a counterattack by the United States on those responsible
would be justified. The same percentage, fifty-seven percent, also rejected the idea of
German participation in such a counterattack. So, a majority of Germans believed that the
United States should launch an attack against terrorists in Afghanistan, but did not want
Germany to join the invasion. Public support for military action against terrorists did not,
therefore, entail support for German military intervention. German and United States
intelligence began working closely together, recognizing that if there were to be a United
States attack against Afghanistan and that if Germany were to join the United States in
that effort, the threat level to Germany would increase dramatically. Germany also
attempted to employ a more multi-lateral approach to preventing an increased escalation
by sending Joschka Fischer to speak with the Israelis and the Palestinians to revive their
dialogue and prevent a wide-scale Middle East conflict. Fischer was ultimately
unsuccessful. Fischer and Schroeder each made trips to the United States, both to learn
what the United States was planning and to try and shape the response as much as
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possible, using their pledge of solidarity to get the United States to take German and
European concerns seriously.98
Despite concerns over terrorist attacks, the domestic political scene created the
most direct danger to the Schroeder government. German parliament had officially shown
support U.S. actions in Afghanistan, but Schroeder’s own coalition and various members
of the German public expressed concerns, in the days following the vote, over the
legitimacy of a United States military response to the acts of terror and the wisdom of
Schroeder’s pledge of “uneingeschraenkte Solidaritaet” with the Americans.99 By the end
of September, Schroeder was trying to figure out how to gain enough support for sending
troops to Afghanistan and was reportedly speculating with ideas ranging from ignoring
opposition within his own coalition to forming a grand coalition with the Christian
Democrats, who were much more supportive of military action. Opposition within the
SPD and the Green Party voiced concerns that a war would cause civilian deaths and
potentially bring more instability to a region of the world already wracked by poverty,
corruption, and fanaticism. As it became clear that Schroeder and Fischer would support
United States military action, the first rumblings came from the Green constituency that
they would not accept such a move and that it would tear apart the coalition. The
government was helped by the fact that the United States did not move extremely quickly
in their attack on Afghanistan. A quick attack would have indicated a thirst for revenge
and an attempt to display American power and would have created rapid German
opposition to the entire conflict. When the United States declared war against
Afghanistan on October 7, 2001 by launching Operation Enduring Freedom, Schroeder
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announced that he would continue to support the United States and left the door open for
possible German participation.100
In contrast to the German reaction to the First Gulf War, a majority of Germans
supported the American invasion of Afghanistan, but were concerned about potential
civilian casualties.101 Retired general Hartmut Bagger criticized the scope of the United
States bombing because too many civilian sites were being hit.102 As the war continued
into November, many German voices continued to offer skepticism of the United States’
strategy and were concerned by the lack of a legal or political complement to the military
mission. However, no Bundestag faction, except for the PDS, actually wanted to end the
American actions. No one seemed willing to turn against the United States so soon after
the attacks on the World Trade Center. On November 6, Gerhard Schroeder asked that
Germany honor the U.S. request for German military aid by sending 3,900 troops to
Afghanistan to be made available in the campaign against terrorism. Most of the
promised German soldiers provided various types of logistical, and not combat, roles.
The German military contribution would consist of soldiers to operate nuclear, biological,
and chemical detection tanks, a medical unit of some 250 Bundeswehr soldiers, air
transport forces, naval forces, and logistical support forces. A little noticed part of the
offered military package was the German government’s request that German armed
forced be only deployed in Northern part of Afghanistan. Schroeder did not broadly
publicize this information, but on November 12, 2001, the Green party did publicly state
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that German troop movements would be very limited in Afghanistan. Such details were to
be figured out later. Schroeder’s request for troops meant that his support of the United
States was put to the test and the Chancellor was put on the defensive.103
Schroeder’s announcement brought criticism from several sides, including voices
on the political Left, Right, and from the German academia. Schroeder’s cabinet
approved of his plan to make troops available, but several members within the SPD104
and the Green Party spoke out against the plan and threatened to vote against it, thereby
also threatening coalition stability. Schroeder responded with power politics, a form of
political strong arming, to get his plan passed and despite his success, created a political
atmosphere which was ripe for severe criticism and protest from the German public, as
well as politicians within the Bundestag.
Initially, the Schroeder administration reacted calmly to the threat of opposition
within its own party and noted that the Free Democrats and the Christian Democrats were
moving to support sending troops to Afghanistan and that enough positive votes were
already lined up to pass the proposal. However, Schroeder appeared to be struggling with
the fact that having opposition come from within his own party made him look weak. He
also seemed concerned about the fact that a foreign policy split within the SPD during
Helmut Schmidt’s administration twenty years ago had weakened and caused the failure
of Schmidt’s government. Therefore, Schroeder decided on an aggressive move to try and
bring the SPD in line with his own goals. On November 13, 2001, Schroeder announced
103

“Operation Enduring Freedom: Foreign Pledges of Military and Intelligence Support,” CRS Report for
Congress, October 17, 2001.
104
Social Democratic Party, a traditionally somewhat more liberal party and the ruling party in German
politics from 1998-2005. Often found itself playing the role of the main opposition party in German
politics.

72

that he would be putting his government in jeopardy by tying the vote on Afghanistan to
a Vertrauensfrage or a vote of confidence. The SPD was being asked to decide between
going to war or seeing their government fall. The vote, on both Afghanistan and the
Vertrauensfrage, was to be held on November 16 and would be nationally televised.105
Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer also needed to apply some strong arm tactics to
the Green Party. Naturally, the Green Party was struggling with the need for war since
the Party’s history was one of anti-militarism and preserving the environment. Fischer
stood by Schroeder and felt that Germany needed to aid the United States in Afghanistan
in light of the terrorist attacks just the month before. Fischer met with the Green Party
Bundestag faction and informed them that he would step down from his position if they
voted against the planned military involvement in Afghanistan. The Berliner Zeitung
quoted him saying “Ich klebe nicht an diesem Sessel,” or “I am not tied to this seat. 106”
The Green Party consisted of only a small percentage of the Bundestag, but represented
the left wing, peaceful ideals of many Germans. The Green Party was also part of
Schroeder’s government coalition and therefore, helped to represent the majority of the
government and also the majority of German public opinion.
The days after Schroeder’s announcement were chaotic as his move to discipline
his own party had upset many within the SPD. Voting on German involvement in a war
was an issue of great importance and politicians wanted to be able to vote based on their
own conscience and what their constituents wanted. They did not want to have the added
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pressure of considering the failure of the current government added to what was already a
difficult decision. The Greens, in particular, were in a bad position since they would
probably have trouble regaining the necessary five percent of the vote needed to have
representatives in the Bundestag. Most of the Greens were actually supportive of
Schroeder’s proposal, but there were twelve Greens who were truly pacifist and were
against the war based on principle and not because they did not believe that Germany
should not be involved. The Christian Democrats were also upset since they felt that they
could not vote “yes” on the Vertrauensfrage, because they were in the opposition party,
even though they were willing to support the war on terror. One factor that made the
decision easier to vote “yes” for sending German troops to Afghanistan was news of
American successes on all fronts. Kabul had fallen to the Northern Alliance, a local
Afghan force that had been formed to fight the Taliban, and other Taliban strongholds
were weakening. The Greens especially, grasped at this news as a weak rationalization to
vote “yes” on the war.107
Many Germans seemed torn on what they wanted to happen despite being
supportive of the U.S. military campaign. On the day before the November 16 debate and
vote, the magazine Stern appeared with photos of a number of well-known Germans
from show business, politics, business, and literature with the title “Prominent Germans
demand: Stop this war!” The twelve page article demonstrated the depth of German
uncertainty about the conflict, and the strength of anti-militarism even in the face of
terrorist attacks.108 While Americans appeared to be nearly completely supportive of the
“war on terror,” Germans continued to reflect on the moral and political issues, worrying
107
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that this might be the wrong path, with too many innocent casualties and the chance that
the conflict could spread and create more problems that would prove difficult to resolve.
Polls from Infratest Dimap indicated that in November Germans were still supportive of
America’s invasion of Afghanistan, but did not want German troops to be sent over.
Support of Schroeder’s proposal by the CDU/CSU and the FDP would allow the RedGreen coalition to show that they had the capacity to complete the transition from
German anti-militarism to getting approval for full German participation in allied military
actions. The debate that took place before the November 16, 2001 vote provides a
window into the views of German leaders and some prominent members of the German
public that shows how deep the norms of anti-militarism and pacifism had become. Even
broad German support for American actions and a fear of terrorism were not enough to
make Germans easily vote in favor of military involvement.
The November 16 debate was carried out on live German television on a Friday
morning. The two issues that were the focus of the debate were whether or not Germany
should make 3,900 troops available to participate in Operation Enduring Freedom and
also whether Schroeder and the Red-Green coalition should be allowed to continue to
govern. Schroeder opened the debate with a calm explanation for why he believed that
Germany should participate in the fight and also why he had called for a Vertrauensfrage.
He outlined the opportunity presented by the war for providing humanitarian aid to the
suffering people of Afghanistan. The pieces were falling into place for establishing a
stable democratic government in Kabul and the United Nations would soon have the
opportunity to unify Afghanistan.109 Schroeder emphasized that the current German
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government coalition had, since being voted into power, been focused on bringing
stability to the rest of the world through a variety of alliances and the defense of freedom.
100 million Deutschmarks (DM) had already been set aside for humanitarian purposes in
Afghanistan to protect people from the approach of winter. Another 160 million DM had
also been set aside for the re-building of Afghanistan. Schroeder pointed out that current
military success against the Taliban had provided opportunities to finally put that money
to work.110
Turning to Germany’s particular role, the chancellor argued that since 1989
Germany had accepted new duties as a partner with equal rights in the family of nations.
This meant that Germany could not stand aside and let others do the work in securing
peace and security. Schroeder also explained his reasons for calling a Vertrauensfrage
under article 68 of the German constitution even though he would have a received a
majority vote for the proposal. He argued that he needed to show the world and German
citizens that his own coalition government stood with him and the German government
was not divided and fragmented on such an important decision. This would be the only
way to demonstrate decisively that Germany would be relied upon. Schroeder was
already building on the themes that he would rely on when asked to defend Germany’s
involvement in Afghanistan to the German public. He mentioned humanitarian aid,
supporting Germany’s allies, and establishing Germany’s place in a post-Cold War
world.111
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Several other politicians, like CDU speaker Friedrich Merz, questioned the ability
of the Red-Green coalition to govern effectively. He called out “anti-American” voices in
the SPD and Green Party and noted that he strongly supported Schroeder’s call for
troops, but also thought that the Vertrauensfrage was completely unnecessary. Kerstin
Mueller of the Greens reminded her colleagues that the debate about involvement in
Afghanistan was a question of hot dispute in society and it did German democracy no
good simply to ignore the concerns of the general public and make it seem as if worries
and concerns about a decision are somehow illegitimate. Mueller noted that there were
still those in Germany who remembered the Nazi era and the horrors of war and that the
Bundestag should consider Germany’s past before rushing to war in Afghanistan.112
Numerous other arguments were thrown back and forth for participating in
Afghanistan and other representatives stood to attack or defend the government. SPD
leaders, such as Peter Struck and Gert Weisskirchen, stressed humanitarian problems in
Afghanistan and how Germany needed to participate in Afghanistan so that it could
influence the political developments and play a role in trying to support long-term
diplomatic solutions. They emphasized that the last twenty-two years of Afghan history
had been marked by war and deprivation, arguing that war could initiate a process
leading to a better future. The SPD speakers stated that it would be pointless for Germany
to refuse to be involved and have nothing to say about what was done down the line.
Opposition speakers from the CDU and FDP focused less on the issue of war, most likely
because of their previously voiced support, and instead attacked the coalition for not
being united on the issue in the first place, claiming that this hurt Germany’s reputation
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and threatened to cause others not to trust Germany to be a partner in times of need. 113 In
regards to the war, the FDP and CDU shared the emphasis on humanitarian aid and a
need to establish peace, even though the FDP leader mocked the Green for believing that
“people who would only understand force” could be reasoned with using human rights
resolutions.114
When the vote finally took place, four of the Greens voted “no” to assuage their
consciences in regards to war while the other 43 Greens voted “yes” to support the
coalition. The Red-Green coalition needed 334 votes and received 336 votes supporting
the proposal with 326 votes against. Schroeder and Fischer had managed to lead most of
the traditionally pacifist German Left of the SPD and Green Party, into supporting
German participation in military action. Many CDU and PDS party members, along with
four Green and one SPD member voted against the deployment of troops and the vote of
confidence. Much of the CDU opposition expressed support for the war even as they
voted “no” against the coalition. Germany had agreed to send troops to Afghanistan and
much of Germany seemed to agree with the decision. That opposition to military action
came from the German Left, comprised mostly of the PDS and Greens, served as no
surprise because of their traditional pacifist stances. Schroeder’s policies had received
support from across the political aisle and seemed to represent a broader German
sentiment of wanting to help and guide policy building and reconstruction in
Afghanistan. However, any sense of German unity on the war was not long lived. Shortly
after German deployment in Afghanistan, concerns over civilian casualties and questions
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over the purpose of Germany’s involvement in Afghanistan began to surface in the form
of protests and strongly worded editorials in major magazines and newspapers.115
The vote had passed and Germany was sending troops on a military mission
outside of European borders for the first time since World War Two. A poll in the
Leipziger Volkszeitung showed that approximately 60 percent of Germans were against
German participation in such a combat mission outside of Europe.116 However, as the
coalition forces appeared to push towards a swift victory by mid-November, German
support shot up to two-thirds for Operation Enduring Freedom. In December 2001,
Schroeder and Fischer hosted the “post-war”117 reconstruction talks and the agreement to
help create a broad-based transitional government, eliciting talk about a permanent
German seat on the United Nations Security Council.118 Germany agreed to provide over
4,000 troops to participate with the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) for
patrolling and rebuilding Afghanistan. Opposition to German engagement in Afghanistan
also worried that the door had been opened for Germany to possibly get involved in
military operations in East Timor, Sudan, Macedonia, Kosovo, Bosnia, Georgia, Kuwait,
Kenya, the Strait of Gibraltar, Uganda, and the Mediterranean Sea. German Defense
Minister Scharping warned that the German Bundeswehr might be stretched too thin.119
Despite good feelings at the Bonn Conference regarding reconstruction in
Afghanistan, the war was not truly over. German forces found themselves in firefights on
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the ground and coalition forces were still conducting airstrikes and other missions against
Taliban forces. German public support quickly waned as reports of civilian casualties
started to be reported in the news. Civilian casualties seemed to bring back memories of
World War Two and the many atrocities that had been carried out by both sides resulting
in massive civilian deaths. The German peace movement seemed to shake off its post
Srebrenica shell shock and moved to protest German involvement in Afghanistan. A
number of anti-war protests were staged in several major German cities as polls started to
show a drop in support for military operations in Afghanistan. The British newspaper,
The Guardian, reported on a number of protests around the world including over 25,000
protestors taking to the streets in German cities. The largest German demonstration took
place in Berlin on October 13, 2001, where over 15,000 people marched to the central
square carrying banners that read, “No war – stand up for peace.”120 The anti-war rally
filled the Gendarmenmarkt, a large square in front of Berlin’s main concert hall, and
spilled onto surrounding streets for several blocks in every direction. At least 30 pacifist
and anti-globalization groups participated in the demonstration against the war in
Afghanistan. “It’s the biggest deomstration we’ve had,” said Hans-Christian Stroebele, a
member of the Green Party. “We stand with America, but we don’t stand with this
war.”121 Ronny Weise, a student and web designer from Berlin, added, “Ultimately the
war will not end the violence. It’s not a modern reaction. It’s a Middle Ages response.
The vicious circle of violence has to be broken.”122
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An article in Der Freitag, written by Dietmar Wittich in April 2002, pointed out
that Germans believed that the war continued in Afghanistan even though the United
States had announced that their actions had been successful. The article also discussed the
fact that Germans became more hesitant to support combat in Afghanistan as reports of
German deaths started to creep into the media, but that there was still a general sense of
support for Germany’s military presence overseas. The German government attempted to
engage in some media control to maintain public support for troop involvement and
employed a tactic of not informing the public about some of German military casualties
occurring in Afghanistan because of combat actions. Reports surfaced in 2003 that two
soldiers had died at the beginning of 2003, but that official sources had not specified the
cause of death despite the fact that the German soldiers; deaths were likely connected to
hostile actions. German media also reported in 2005 that at least twelve Kommando
Spezialkraefte (German special forces) had died in Afghanistan since the war started, but
an interview five years later with KSK commander Hans-Christoph Ammon reported that
no KSK soldiers had been killed in action.123 However, a press release from United States
European Command confirmed that at least one soldier had been killed in actions
sometime before 2005.124
The World Politics Review wrote in 2011 that the government had been severely
handcuffing the German media concerning reports on German actions in Afghanistan. In
those instances where the news media reports on German operations that the government
would rather have ignored, the official response was swift and unrelenting. When the
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Financial Times Deutschland reported on German offensive operations in early 2003,
officials from the German Foreign Ministry were in the FTD offices within days of the
article’s publication to dispute the paper’s characterization of the event.125 Military
actions presented to the public were depicted as harmless, while the good deeds of the
army were emphasized. Reports, pictures, and videos of German troops providing
humanitarian aid were more commonplace in the news than reports of combat. Though,
as discussed later in this chapter, there were still plenty of reports about civilian and
soldier deaths that were shown and negatively affected German public opinion. Germany
was a democratic country where the government only had limited control over media
outlets. Wittich speculated that the government’s tactics of allowing fewer combat reports
to surface were more effective in the West than they were in the East since a slight
majority of Germans in Western Germany were supportive of military engagement in
Afghanistan while a majority in the East was opposed. However, initial support for troop
deployment barely hovered above 50% and started to decline before 2002 ended.126
German news media, like the Deutsche Welle (DW), began to report unrest within
the German public. A report from the DW on March, 2002 reported that “Afghanistan
Angst”127 was starting to develop throughout Germany. The German Defense Ministry
reported in early March of 2002 that the first Bundeswehr soldiers had died near Kabul.
The DW stated that Germans were beginning to awaken to the reality that Germany might
be at war and not just on a humanitarian mission in Afghanistan and that German soldiers
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might be active participants in combat. The DW mentioned that the German government
was trying to restrict sensitive information to protect soldiers, but also to protect
“Afghanistan Angst.” Shortly after news broke that some German troops were engaged in
combat the German newspaper, Welt am Sonntag, gave a vague report that a wave of
hysteria swept through Calw, where many families of German special forces soldiers
lived (KSK), in south-western Germany.128 The German Ministry of Defense quickly
squashed the story and attacked the media in general by saying that German journalists
were being unprofessional in their attempts to gain information over the deployment of
German Special Forces and that family members of KSK soldiers had to be given new
identities to protect them from potential terrorist attacks.129
Wittich was not accusing the German government of propaganda. Memories of
Hitler and Goebbels’ uses of propaganda during World War Two added a considerable
amount of heavy meaning to that word. Largely, German television media did very little
to increase the conflict between the German government and the German public. News
stations, like ARD and ZDF, were very willing to roundly criticize the United States and
show civilian casualties, but generally did not show any news or pictures that were overly
critical of German actions in Afghanistan. Since 2009, reports by the German media,
steeped heavily in hindsight, were more than willing to severely critique the way that the
German media generally reported on the war in Afghanistan. Hans Wallow, writing for
Der Freitag in 2009, wrote that the German media distorted the reality of Afghanistan by
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leaving out difficult facts.130 Even news stations like ARD left out reports and visuals
about the deaths of German soldiers or glossed over how soldiers died. Even word choice
was important. German media did not use the word “Gefallene” or fallen soldiers until
late 2008. Words like “torn from life” or “perished” were more commonly used. The term
“Gefallene” was strongly associated with soldiers killed in war. Emphasis was placed on
the fact that the Bundeswehr was involved in a peacekeeping mission and not an
invasion.131 Reports of children going to school and young girls playing soccer were
more important than the dangerous missions upon which some German soldiers were
embarking. In 2013, the German news station ZDF released a number of documentaries
about the war in Afghanistan which actually used the word propaganda. The
documentary War-Our War-Combat Deployment Afghanistan stated that the rosy picture
painted of Afghanistan throughout the early years of the war was propaganda and that the
living status of the general Afghan people had not improved. In fact, Afghanistan had
become one of the most corrupt nations in the world and the introduction of more troops,
German or otherwise, actually created a less safe environment for the local Afghan
population.132 Critiques of the German involvement in the war were largely found in
newspapers or in editorials and not in television news.
German public discourse regarding the role of the German military was strongly
informed by a “civilian power” perspective. A civilian power only uses the military as a
last resort and attempts to find other multilateral solutions. Combat aspects of the army’s
job description were only regarded as secondary and were systematically played down.
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Germans viewed Germany as more of a civilian power and less of a military power.
Foreign policy revolved around diplomacy, economics, and humanitarian aid instead of
military action. The German military represented an organization whose main purpose
was defending Germany and delivering humanitarian aid outside of Germany as stated in
the German constitution. Overseas deployments were meant to be rare and required
parliamentary approval. Many Germans viewed the military as a highly organized
humanitarian aid institution. The German government seemed to be taking advantage of
the fact that many Germans tended to view the Bundeswehr in favorable terms because
most Germans saw the Germany military in the context of humanitarian aid. The
Bundeswehr’s Social Science Institute (SOWI)133 reports of public opinion poll data
since the mid-1970s in Germany showed that German soldiers were highly esteemed for
all sorts of disaster relief and humanitarian actions, but decidedly not for the military part
of their job. When asked about the priorities of Germany’s foreign policy and security
policy, the most prominent issues and goals, with high degrees of concurrence among
Germans were disaster relief, prevention of genocide, and environment protection.134
Careful attention was paid to making sure that the German public understood that
Germany’s approach was multilateral and encompassed more than just an armed presence
in Afghanistan. The German foreign policy website stated that, “military means alone are
insufficient to build a stable Afghanistan capable of protecting its citizens and providing
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essential services.”135 The government sought to create an emphasis on the good work
being done in Afghanistan by Germany through their foreign policy website. Germany
was portrayed, by the government to its citizens, as a “strong and reliable partner in the
international efforts to help build an Afghanistan that will never become a haven for
terrorists.”136 Germany’s efforts to stabilize and reconstruct Afghanistan were highlighted
as well as the fact that German military engagement had been fully in line with the
priorities outlined for Afghanistan by NATO and the broader international community.
Opportunities were being provided for employment and support was given towards the
creation of an Afghan government that would be able to provide education, basic
services, and infrastructure with the ultimate goal of handing over rule of Afghanistan to
Afghan authorities.137
German security strategy was dependent on the support that the German public
was willing to lend its parliament. In 1999, Detlef Puhl, speaker for the German Ministry
of Defense, noted that “public support for government action is a fragile that has to be
fought for every day and there is no alternative to freely consented public support. This is
especially critical in times of military action.”138 German public opinion was initially
supportive of sending German troops to Afghanistan to help stabilize the country, but was
not supportive of military engagement.139 Late 2001 into early 2002 saw support in
Germany sitting at 61 percent for the war and 31 percent against the war fought by the
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United States.140 However, by the summer of 2002 the split had already reached 50-50
and approval for German military deployment continued to drop. When the Iraq War
started in 2003 there were limited polls taken on Afghanistan, but by 2007 approximately
two-thirds of the German population was expressing disapproval with the war in general
and with German involvement and that number continued to rise.141 Various factors for
the drop in approval were determined by looking at German pacifist ideals, concerns for
how the United States was conducting the war, civilian casualties, German casualties,
concerns for the future of Afghanistan, and the fact that many Germans felt that
Afghanistan was not truly a humanitarian crisis and did not actually require German
Bundeswehr involvement.
Early German public opinion on the war in Afghanistan was relatively divided.
Many Germans seemed to feel that something should be done about Afghanistan and
terrorist activity, but did not believe that German military involvement should be the first
course of action. Dietmar Wittich reported in the newspaper Der Freitag on April 5, 2002
that fifty-eight percent of Germans were supportive of diplomacy and talks over German
military action. In late 2001, fifty seven percent of Germans had still been supportive of
an American invasion, but by the spring of 2002 support for even the American invasion
began waning because of the negative reports on United States tactics and civilian deaths.
He also wrote that nearly two thirds of Germans were against the deployment of NATO
ground troops. Wittich pointed out that there was a distinct difference of opinion among
the political parties. Voters for the CDU/CSU and FDP were fairly accepting of German
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military options with 53% and 51% respectively, which was not necessarily a strong
majority. Green Party, SPD, and PDS voters were unsure that German military force was
the correct option.142
An editorial in the Frankfurter Rundschau newspaper, by Ludger Volmer143 in
early 2002 discussed German pacifism and conscience as stemming from both religious
ideals and cultural memory of World War II. “Nie wieder Auschwitz, Nie wieder Krieg
(Never again Ausschwitz, Never again War)!” Volmer also argued that political pacifism
was directed by societal norms, but had to find a way to respond to supposed enemies and
threats. Pacifist Germans had the duty to push back the emphasis on military action and
call for more multi-lateral actions in the war on terror. The German government should
not necessarily reject the use of military options, but should not consider the military to
be the only option.144 Volmer was writing mostly for Green Party supporters, a
traditionally pacifist party, but his articles reached a larger German population through
various pacifist oriented publications, like the AG Friedensforschung which was a
university group based around peace research. Some reader responses to his article
included confirmation of the concept that pacifism in Germany needed to be stronger
now than ever. Germans needed to step up and support a downsizing of German military
activity and search for other methods of dealing with the Taliban in Afghanistan. Some
readers criticized Volmer for siding too much with the United States and not pushing
hard enough for an end to German engagement in Afghanistan. One reader, Hans-Juergen
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Kolbe, wrote that the Afghanistan conflict was a questionable disciplinary action and
expressed concern that the United States would call for German support in a more
aggressive war. Kolbe wrote that he believed non-military options to be available, but
that the government had to want them.145
One major concern that plagued many Germans, both civilians and politicians,
before the Bundeswehr even deployed to Afghanistan was the United States strategy for
carrying out the war. Reports of civilian deaths and non-military targets being bombed
circulated through Germany and negatively impacted the slight majority in favor of
deployment in Afghanistan. Many Germans were worried that Germany would be pulled
or coerced into a similar type of warfare. In fact, many Germans felt that their fears had
been realized when in 2003 the new German Defense Minister, Peter Struck, made an
extremely controversial statement saying that Germany’s security was being defended in
the Hindu Kush.146 The German media and general public reacted with astonishment and
lack of understanding, despite the fact that terrorism had become a global phenomenon.
Even before Struck’s statement, some German media were not playing along with
government attempts to create a softer image of the conflict and started pushing back
against the German involvement in Afghanistan by reporting civilian deaths and other
atrocities committed by the Western coalition. In December of 2002, ARD, a German
news station, aired the documentary Afghan Massacre: the Convoy of Death filmed by
Irishman Jamie Doran about the massacre of Taliban prisoners in the Dasht-i-Leili desert.
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The German newspaper Der Spiegel, reported that the United States government strongly
criticized Germany for showing Doran’s film. The documentary accused American
soldiers of standing by and possibly being involved while Taliban prisoners were stuffed
into containers for transport. Many Taliban died due to lack of oxygen and possibly from
American soldiers shooting holes into the containers. The American government denied
any allegations and the only evidence for the film came from eyewitness accounts. The
German government was called upon, by publications like Der Spiegel and public outcry,
to launch an investigation into the possible massacre. Several years after the documentary
came out there were still some tensions about the massacre which even led to President
Obama asking his national security team to look into the allegations that the Bush
administration had resisted calls to have the matter investigated.147
Concerns over civilian casualties were even more relevant to Germans than war
atrocities against captured combatants. An article in Der Spiegel on January 1, 2002,
pointed out that many civilians were being killed during “Operation Enduring Freedom”
and that no real attempt was being made to tally up the dying. The article claimed that
reports of dead civilians had been rolling in since the beginning of the war, but that no
one was really sure how many had been killed. The “precision war” being carried out by
the Coalition was being touted in the American media as an efficient war that would
reduce casualties and bring about swift victory by eliminating important targets and
leaders. Dr. Marc Herold, a professor at the University of New Hampshire, criticized the
United States media for not considering the civilian casualties to be important, so as to
maintain American public support for the war. Many Germans, on the other hand, called
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on memories from World War Two and the millions of civilian deaths caused by
indiscriminate bombing. 148
Often, public opinion will turn against armed conflicts when reports of casualties
start coming in from the front. The United States certainly experienced this trend during
the Vietnam War. Endgame for the West in Afghanistan? was a report written for the
Strategic Studies Institute and clearly laid out a series of studies that demonstrated how
each country involved in the war in Afghanistan began to lose support for military actions
when reports of casualties started mounting.149 Germany lost significantly less troops
than other countries involved, but the results were very much the same. Many Germans
had been very sensitive to casualty reports since World War Two nearly wiped out a
generation of soldiers. Most of Germany’s limited casualties in Afghanistan were
incurred during 2002 and 2003, 19 deaths, and the trajectory of German public approval
for the war deteriorated along with the increased deaths. Even though the German
government tried to limit reports of soldier deaths, certain news sources, like Der Spiegel,
continued to remind the German people that Germans were dying in Afghanistan. The
fact that most of the deaths were non-combat related did not seem to matter. Leaders in
the German government worked to keep German troops out of dangerous areas. One way
that German strategy in Afghanistan reflected the need to protect troops was by
stipulating that Germany would only be willing to operate in Northern Afghanistan where
there was less fighting. German soldiers were also given orders to never pursue enemies
beyond the small German areas of control and soldiers not allowed to patrol at night. Any
148
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attempt made to argue that casualties were not a key factor in the fall of German public
support for the war runs into a “chicken and egg” problem since German casualties were
low precisely because fear of the public’s reaction to casualties caused German leaders to
minimize the risk for German troops.150
The German government spent a significant amount of time and effort trying to
convince the German public that the Bundeswehr was being deployed on a humanitarian
mission to Afghanistan. Most German politicians seemed convinced that what they were
doing was right and so, in subsequent years the Bundestag would continue to extend
Germany’s stay in Afghanistan. In the case of Kosovo, the humanitarian aspect of the
deployment of German forces was dominant. Gerhard Schroeder and Joschka Fischer had
argued it was a moral responsibility to help end gross violations of human rights within
Europe. In Afghanistan, the situation was different. Many Germans did not view
Afghanistan as a humanitarian emergency, and the alternative of not acting would not
have had the same consequences as Kosovo. The terrorist attacks on the United States
provided less obvious humanitarian reasons for military involvement in Afghanistan than
genocide had provided for military involvement in Kosovo. Assisting another super
power against a poor war-torn nation certainly offered some basis for the argument that
the Bundeswehr was involved in a humanitarian mission, but the stakes were not the
same for Germans as they had been in Kosovo.
There was also a sense in Germany that Afghanistan was a lost cause shortly after
the war began. The Taliban began to reform and fight back shortly after the United States
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had declared victory and the country was in complete disarray. Germans felt that
Afghanistan was too disorganized and would possibly never have a stable democracy.
Reports about warlords, robber, bands and corruption gained some traction in Germany.
Der Spiegel ran an article about the widespread corruption running rampant in
Afghanistan since the fall of the Taliban. Hamid Karzai, the leader of the transitional
government and eventual president of Afghanistan, was viewed as corrupt. Afghan
commanders were asking for large amounts of cash from news teams for interviews.
Even in early 2002, many Germans were losing hope that Afghanistan would ever be able
to become a properly unified and civilized country and therefore, the need for the
Bundeswehr to conduct a humanitarian campaign seemed pointless.151
German public support was dropping despite a strong campaign by the German
government to shift public opinion in favor of the war. German cultural anti-war taboos
and general anti-war feelings caused support for the war to hover just above fifty percent.
Germans were willing to tolerate the war in Afghanistan as long as it seemed that the
Bundeswehr was part of a peacekeeping operation and was generally staying out of
combat. However, German anti-war feelings had been stirred up by the war in
Afghanistan and by mid-2002 burst forth and combined with anti-American feelings to
strongly protest the approaching Iraq War. The war in Afghanistan was disapproved of
and never openly protested in the streets like the Iraq War was, but public disapproval of
Afghanistan strongly influenced decisions made surrounding the Iraq War.
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German anti-Americanism and the Iraq War
German foreign policy regarding Afghanistan cannot be discussed without also
analyzing Germany’s refusal to join the invasion of Iraq in 2003. Debate over the extent
and area of Germany’s deployment in Afghanistan had been affected by fears that
Germany might be asked to join an offensive in Iraq. United States President George W.
Bush gave early indications, even in 2001, that Iraq was next in America’s sights and that
an invasion was probably inevitable. Tensions increased between Germany and America
throughout 2001 and onward as German distrust towards the United States grew based on
German misgivings about the Bush administration’s “cowboy” approach to foreign
policy.152 Bush tried to create a link between the War on Terror and toppling Saddam
Hussein’s administration, but Germans, both public and in the government, were not
willing to buy that argument. Disapproval of American tactics in Afghanistan appeared to
factor into doubts about how another military campaign would be carried out and whether
the United States was truly seeking to continue the war on terrorism or whether other
factors, like revenge or oil, were coming into play. The German public strongly protested
the Iraq War and Gerhard Schroeder sided with his constituency as he realized that there
was no way of convincing them to support what Bush was calling “an extension of the
war in Afghanistan.” Schroeder wrote in his memoirs that he was opposed to the war
itself, but would have been willing to aid the United States in an attempt to preserve good
relations between the two countries.
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Even by early 2002, the international debate on what to do with Iraq and Saddam
Hussein began to overshadow any discussion about Afghanistan. Interest in Iraq created a
more limited amount of poll data for public opinion on Afghanistan, but indicated that the
German government had pushed the German public too far and that further war was
unacceptable. Any tolerance for the conflict in Afghanistan had used up German
willingness to support military missions abroad. German criticisms over Bundeswehr
soldiers being engaged in active combat in Afghanistan exploded on an entirely new level
when confronted with the possibility of sending troops into Iraq as well. The German
government had to make a decision whether it would continue to support American
foreign policy or join German anti-war protesters in decrying another military action in
the Middle East. Schroeder and Fischer found themselves in a difficult position where
they had to consider whether the Red-Green Coalition could survive another decision to
send German troops into harm’s way. Both leaders stressed in their memoirs that they
believed an invasion of Iraq was foolish, but felt that they had made promises to the
United States government of possible aid, in the form of unrestricted access to German
military bases, for an invasion of Iraq. After the combat operations in Kosovo and
Afghanistan, there were already signs that the Bundeswehr had been stretched too far
based on current size and military equipment. A strong segment of German public
opinion, with its predisposition against the use of force, also opposed further German
troop deployments into a potential war. The pacifist histories of the SPD and the Green
Party made them especially vulnerable to public concerns about the use of military
force.153
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In Germany, already at the beginning of the war in Afghanistan, a slow but steady
distancing from U.S. leadership by the German public and government had begun to set
in. Tensions had been evident in German-U.S. relations since Germany had re-unified in
the nineties and emerged as a world power. Germany quickly became a big player in
European politics and the United States still largely tried to influence what was
happening on the European continent. Both sides worked at maintaining good relations
and at the beginning of his first term in 1998, Schroeder supported the Clinton
administration’s military actions, like air strikes against terrorist networks in Sudan and
Afghanistan in the summer of 1998. Most importantly, the chancellor supported NATO
policy in Kosovo and the use of force there. Certain issues, like the proposed no-first-use
policy regarding NATO and nuclear weapons154, created conflict between the two nations
as Germany and America did not see eye to eye. Overall though, German-American
relations were relatively warm until the election of George W. Bush.155
The first official meeting between Gerhard Schroeder and George W. Bush on
March 29, 2001, was overshadowed by unbridgeable differences with regard to the Kyoto
protocol. Germany was looking to lead the world in reducing greenhouse gasses and the
United States largely opposed its efforts because of the possible detrimental effects on the
American economy. This was actually the first time a policy disagreement between the
two countries went on public record. One sentence in the minutes of this meeting
certainly did not escape the attention of the new American administration: a passage
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under the title “evaluation,” which described the new U.S. president as “inexperienced”
and “influenceable.” Usually, these minutes are top secret, but this one was only marked
“confidential and went to several dozen officials in the German government. Der Spiegel
was able to quote directly from the document.156 It was not the finest hour of German
diplomacy, and let everyone see the beginning of a troubled relationship in substance and
style.
Iraq appeared as a foreign policy issue that Bush and Schroeder had trouble
seeing eye to eye on even before the September 11 attacks. Paul O’Neill, the former
Secretary of the Treasury who had served in Bush’s first cabinet, was convinced that the
Bush administration had begun planning for an invasion of Iraq even as early as January
of 2001.157 Regime change, after all, was the declared United States policy against rogue
states. The Clinton administration had also considered regime change in Iraq as a United
States policy objective. The Iraq Liberation Act, signed into law by President Clinton on
October 31, 1998, stipulated that “it should be the policy of the United States to support
efforts to remove the regime headed by Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq and to
promote the emergence of a democratic government to replace that regime.”158
W. Michael Blumenthal wrote that when the Bush administration took power in
2001 that it soon fell under the sway of neo-conservative advisors.159 Blumenthal
described the neo-conservatives as “radical activists” who maintained a simple black and
156
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white view of a world split into good and evil. Because the United States held a
preponderance of military power, they believed that it should, when necessary, be used
preemptively and unilaterally to promote good and defeat evil.160 Joschka Fischer
believed that the seemingly quick and easy victory in Afghanistan led to extreme
overconfidence by the United States government and the neo-conservatives. Saddam
Hussein and Iraq seemed to become an obsession of the Bush administration throughout
2002.161
Bush’s singling out of North Korea, Iran, and Iraq as the “axis of evil” in his State
of the Union Address on January 29, 2002 was largely interpreted as an announcement of
military actions against this “axis.” Many Germans were wary of Bush’s aggressive
language and were concerned about future military engagements and U.S. aggression.
Fischer stated in an interview with Die Welt in February 2002, that the various European
foreign ministers were all taken aback by Bush’s strong language and that throwing Iran,
North Korea, and Iraq into a single pot would not benefit anyone. Schroeder visited
Washington in February 2002 and upon his return assured Germans that the U.S.
president had not decided anything yet. At home, Schroeder was forced to deal with
growing criticism and concern about Germany’s military commitments. The campaign in
Afghanistan had become extremely unpopular and American foreign policy was received
with suspicion and concern.162
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What began to sink in for the German leader was that the Bush administration’s
official statements about the war on terror would lead to the use of force sooner rather
than later. Schroeder was very cautious about letting politicians close to him know what
he was thinking since many of his advisors were very outspoken. Schroeder was worried
that his concerns would be leaked to the German public and the American government.
Any signs that he was struggling with what do in the Middle East would have led to
difficult conversations both at home and abroad.163 Michael Naumann, minister of culture
from 1998-2001 and close friend of Gerhard Schroeder, reflected Schroeder’s thinking
when he made some observations for the New York Times on February 18, 2002.
Naumann stated that sliding into a conflict with no clear moral sense of one’s mission or
the likely military outcome could lead to an uncontrollable military escalation. Most
Germans were certainly concerned about military escalation since that would require
more troops and exact a great casualty toll. Naumann stated that the undisputed threat of
global terrorism should be met with forceful diplomacy and not American unilateralism
and also raised the question that many Germans seemed to be asking: Who will govern
Iraq after Saddam?164
The Bush administration’s commitment to a doctrine based around preemptive
war was troubling to the German public and government. Concerns surfaced about the
difficulty of distinguishing between legitimate acts of self-defense and wars of
aggression. The new doctrine went beyond classical international law, which recognized
preemption as a legitimate act of self-defense in case of a real imminent threat---most
often a visible mobilization of armies, navies, or air forces and not a putative threat. The
163
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Bush administration claimed the right to take “anticipatory action to defend ourselves,
even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy’s attack.”165 Schroeder
was not only concerned about possible American “wars of choice” but also about the
danger of preemption in other regions of the world, for example, in the crisis-prone
relationship between China and Taiwan.166
President Bush’s visit to Berlin in May 2002, included an address to the
Bundestag which, according to the German chancellor, was surprisingly moderate in
tone. Nothing in the speech or in the official talks revealed any indication that course had
been set for another war. But the chancellor remembered this visit as overshadowed by
massive anti-Bush demonstrations. It was necessary to seal off half the city of Berlin to
guarantee the security of the American president. CNN reported on Friday, May 31, 2002
that over 10,000 heavily equipped police officers were heavily deployed throughout
Berlin. Concerns over tens of thousands of protestors coming to protest against United
States policies on trade, the environment, Afghanistan, and the possible strike against
Iraq were cited as the reason for the heavy police deployment. Earlier in the week, 20,000
protestors had already marched through East Berlin on the eve of Bush’s arrival chanting
“Yankee go home” and waving banners reading “No blood for oil” and “Axis of Evil
runs through the Pentagon.”167 One protestor, Ralf Rippel, was quoted, “We’re not
against America—I have many friends there. We’re against the warmonger Bush.”
Another protestor added, “Bush should be put in front of a war crimes tribunal.” 168 The
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protestors referred to themselves as the “Axis of Peace” and represented over 200
organizations committed to non-violence. The “Axis of Peace” issued a statement that
“The Right to self-defense that the U.S. government claimed after Sept. 11 has long
turned into a pretext for waging war.”169
Bush spoke warmly about German-American relations and Germany’s
contributions in the war on terror, in particular Germany’s support for the war in
Afghanistan. At a meeting afterwards, Schroeder reconfirmed his promise of
“unrestricted solidarity” with the American president and committed himself to stand
shoulder to shoulder with the United States in the fight against terrorism by stating,
“Should Iraq like Afghanistan harbor al Qaeda fighters, we will be a reliable partner of
the United States.”170
Due to the narrow victory in the vote of confidence in November 2001, Schroeder
had to assume that another German military commitment would fail to get the necessary
votes of his own party in the German Bundestag. Based on the Constitutional Court’s
decision in 1994, a majority of the Bundestag was a sine qua non requirement for a
military mission of the Bundeswehr abroad. The United States perceived that Schroeder
stood with them, but failed to make note of the fact that Schroeder said he would not
stand in the way of military intervention “as long as it did not interfere with the election.”
However, as the issue began to affect the 2002 election Schroeder began to take a clearer
stance opposing any military invention in Iraq. Schroeder responded to U.S. criticism by
saying, “how could I have survived the election campaign without taking a clear position
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on an issue that was so moving for the people?” German displeasure with the prospect of
adding another war when there was already so much disapproval of the war in
Afghanistan was strongly affecting Schroeder’s foreign policy moves. The more the
German public focused on the September 22, 2002, national elections, the more it became
obvious that the Red-Green Coalition would need to position itself against a war in Iraq if
it wanted to remain in power. German public opinion had turned anti-Bush during the
war in Afghanistan because of how the United States was conducting the conflict and
fears were raised that Germany might be drawn into a new major war. Chancellor
Schroeder and Foreign Minister Fischer both knew that given the U.S. policies on Iraq on
the one hand, and the state of German public opinion on the other, that a decision on Iraq
needed to be struck soon.171
Public opinion surveys in the summer of 2002 gave Schroeder solid backing for
his foreign policy course. Der Spiegel published poll data from the beginning of August
2002 showing a 51 percent majority for the position that German should not participate in
any way in an invasion of Iraq. The opposition to Iraq was very much in line with the
way that public opinion was trending for the war in Afghanistan. Initial polls for Iraq
started at the same level that Afghanistan disapproval had dropped to after support for
Afghanistan had started higher and dropped down to 50 percent by the summer of 2002.
Only nine percent of Germans were actually willing to send German troops to Iraq. With
respect to party affiliation, the surprising result of the data generated by Infratest was that
CDU/CSU supporters did not think differently from SPD members or even the Greens. A
total of 43 percent of CDU/CSU supporters rejected any German participation in an
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invasion.172 Similar surveys in the middle of August 2002 reinforced the fact that a large
majority of Germans were dead set against any participation in a war. A total of 62
percent of the Germans agreed with the position not to participate in any shape or form in
an attack on Iraq.173 Public opinion specialists even suggested that as long as there was no
concrete threat scenario, roughly 80 percent of the Germans opposed the use of military
force by anyone in Iraq.174
Schroeder still seemed hesitant to commit fully to an anti-war stance. The
Chancellor was convinced that it was necessary to overcome the taboo of using the
German armed forces and to reverse the trend that force should never be used other than
in a case of self-defense. Schroeder had pushed his philosophy on military deployment
through in the cases of Kosovo and also Afghanistan, but his success put him in a
difficult spot in regards to Iraq.175 The majority of German public opinion simply would
not support another war. The Schroeder administration’s arguments for the war in
Afghanistan had garnered just enough support to maintain troops there, but German antiwar feelings were straining against the idea of more fighting. Two-thirds of the German
population opposed the idea of war in Iraq and SPD leaders recognized that the German
public would not change its fundamental position on war. Schroeder’s administration
found itself in a difficult spot. Schroeder wanted to maintain positive relations with the
United States, but was faced with growing domestic discontent over the Afghanistan and
fears over being drawn in to a further conflict in Iraq. Bearing in mind that public opinion
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of the German deployment in Afghanistan was rapidly deteriorating after less than a year,
Schroeder chose to side with public sentiment and openly oppose a new war.176
On August 1, 2002, Schroeder told his party that he would commit himself to
opposing the any military intervention in Iraq and accept full consequences. However,
there was still the issue of the war in Afghanistan. How could the German government
oppose any military engagement in Iraq while still trying to justify their engagement in
Afghanistan? When journalists at the Tageszeitung grilled Fischer on the ostensible
hypocrisy of consenting to the invasion of Afghanistan, but not the war against Iraq, he
responded:
Intervention in Afghanistan was the response to a type of international
terrorism that posed a new threat to international peace. This terrorism
possessed a destructive capacity that in the past only states had. You can’t
negotiate with it. But, in addition to this terrorism, it is at least equally
important to resolve regional conflicts so that the people involved in them
won’t establish links with terrorist organizations. This is the lesson of
September 11: not to permit these forgotten regional conflicts to fester.177

Fischer seemed to be trying to frame Afghanistan as purely a war against terror and
not an invasion against another country. Afghanistan presented security policy for
Germany and the world as well as aid to a country that might harbor terrorists. Schroeder
had told Bush in clear terms, in early 2002, that Germany would be willing to aid in the
war against Iraq if the United States could prove that Iraq was hiding and supporting
terrorists.178 Fischer and Schroeder both began to sense that the United States had long
wanted to oust Saddam Hussein and that the invasion of Iraq would serve to secure
176

Schroeder, 250.
Joschka Fischer, “Ich bin kein Gruener Helmut Kohl,” Tageszeitung, September 19, 2002.
178
Fischer, 118.
177

104

strategic oil reserves and deal a defeat to radical Islam. The German Red-Green
administration was also very doubtful about the presence of weapons of mass destruction.
Fischer wrote that the German government felt that the existence of atomic weapons was
extremely unlikely. The German government also believed that the presence of chemical
weapons was a possibility, but that the weapons were probably outdated and still in stock
after the First Gulf War, and that the presence of biological weapons was unclear, but
could probably be produced fairly easily. 179 The German government was doubtful the
United States’ assertions regarding weapons of mass destruction and did not believe that
enough evidence had been gathered to properly link Iraq and Saddam Hussein to terrorist
plots.
Fischer’s response, when asked why Germany was saying “no” to Iraq, was in
line with Schroeder’s call, in the Bundestag in September 2001, for undercutting terrorist
support by aiding poor and war torn countries. However, Iraq was another story and
Fischer explained to the Tageszeitung:
With Iraq, we’re dealing with the future of the entire Near East.
The real question is whether a war against Iraq is the proper
means to bring about a new order there. Or whether the point of
departure should be brokering a peace between Israel and
Palestine, and then with that as a basis going on to address other
regional problems. Also, we should be moving forward in a spirit
of cooperation rather than confrontation: in order to defuse hatred
in the Near and Middle East, to integrate it into the world
economy and open a way for Islam into modernity.180

Fischer questioned whether a military action was appropriate for bringing about change
in the Middle East. Afghanistan was still depicted as a humanitarian aid campaign in
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Germany and Schroeder and Fischer seemed convinced that humanitarian efforts in
Afghanistan would prove successful in curtailing terrorist activity there. Neither man
could find a way to explain Iraq in terms of humanitarianism so German public opinion
won the day. German public support had been stretched thin over Afghanistan. Schroeder
was forced to try and keep German troops out of harm’s way while demonstrating that
the Bundeswehr was fulfilling a humanitarian mission. Iraq was one step too far and
public outcry against Afghanistan was turned fully against Iraq. Schroeder and Fischer
realized that there was no chance of swinging public opinion in favor of Iraq and
therefore made no attempt. The two politicians had hoped to support the United States
and preserve good relations, but Fischer and Schroeder quickly realized that any hint of a
pro-American stance in the 2002 election would spell their defeat. They sided with public
opinion and loudly decried the war. Schroeder even took to the streets to stand with antiwar demonstrators. Schroeder announced that
This much my government has proven, that in times of crisis it is in
the position, with determination and a level head, to stay a reasonable
course…We’re also prepared to show solidarity, but under my
leadership this country won’t participate in adventures…And
concerning the discussion about military intervention in Iraq, I warn
against speculating about war and military actions, and I say to those
who are planning something, they should not only know how they’re
going to go in, but how they’re going to get out…Playing around with
war and military intervention, this I warn against. With me, that’s not
going to happen.”181

Schroeder’s statement on Iraq may have seemed hypocritical considering the
criticisms of his policy in Afghanistan, but politically his anti-war stance was a success.
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German anti-war fervor was high enough that the promise of not sending German troops
into another Middle Eastern country proved to be a successful political strategy. The
2002 Bundestag election was the closest since the first election in 1949. Fischer and the
Greens provided a much needed political boost and the Red-Greens were elected for
another four year term. Schroeder had lost popularity due to economic difficulties and his
strong support of the war in Afghanistan, but managed to the harness German anti-war
fervor that had developed during Afghanistan and manifested itself throughout the
buildup to the Iraq War. However, the Red-Green political heroics and anti-war policies
were not enough to keep them in power for long. Despite coming out strongly against
Iraq, continued public disapproval and high unemployment served to drive the Red-Green
Coalition out of power in 2005, one year before scheduled elections.182
German public opinion had turned against the United States during the war in
Afghanistan due to American policies and military tactics. Public opinion continued to
sour due, in no small part, to the public discussion in the United States over regime
change in Iraq. On August 27, 2002, American Vice President Dick Cheney gave a
speech in Nashville, Tennessee where he stated that with regard to Iraq “the risks of
inaction are far greater than the risks of action.”183 Cheney’s speech seemed like a strong
case for war as he mentioned Iraq’s pursuance of nuclear weapons and the fact that
Saddam might soon control a great portion of the world’s energy supplies. Cheney also
pointed out that regime change in Iraq would bring about a number of benefits to the
region and that after liberations the streets of Baghdad and Basra would erupt in
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joy.184Internationally, Cheney’s speech received a negative reaction. For Germans,
Cheney’s speech shoved the Iraq War to the forefront and made Iraq an important part of
the upcoming German elections in 2002. Many Germans began to say that the goal of the
Bush administration no longer seemed to be to persuade Iraq to allow unconditional arms
inspections by United Nations experts.185 Instead, the American goal seemed to be to
remove Hussein by military means regardless of whether inspection was to occur or not.
Schroeder, in particular, was resentful at finding out about the speech after it had
occurred through the media. After standing by the United States and barely surviving a
“no confidence” vote, Schroeder felt like he should have been informed or at least
consulted before Cheney had so boldly stated the United States’ intentions for Iraq.
In Germany, traditional anti-American emotions, widespread in the past in
conservative circles, merged with popular left-wing anti-Americanism and a powerful
dislike for the foreign policies of the Bush administration.186 Blumenthal wrote that the
“openly polemical books of Michael Moore” graced the German bestseller lists and were
often given credence as gospel truths.187 Blumenthal also mentioned that he was surprised
at the standing ovations he would receive in Germany when he expressed reservations
about elements of United States policy and the stony silences he encountered when
defending them. He also wrote that statistics were beginning to show that noticeably
fewer students were choosing the United States for their overseas studies. According to
one content analysis, about 600 items on the United States went to air in July 2002 on
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German television news shows. More than 60 percent of these were negative; fewer than
10 percent were positive.188
Although not anti-American, Schroeder did little to contain the growing anti-Bush
sentiments in Germany. The German Iraq War opposition, like earlier waves of
opposition to United States policies, such as the anti-Vietnam war movement and the
peace movement during the missile crisis of the 1980s, included elements of deeply
rooted antagonism, but did not reach the level of true anti-Americanism. Schroeder felt
that political differences must be allowed to be expressed openly, instead of behind
closed doors, and that the democratic process should allow those differences to be played
out in public discourse.189
Schroeder knew how much the American image had changed in Germany and
Europe since the arrival of the Bush administration in 2001. A Pew survey of 38,000
people in forty-four countries found that in 2002, America’s imaged had slipped
worldwide compared with prior polls conducted by the State Department.190 Another
survey conducted in 2003 after the invasion of Iraq would show that those numbers were
no longer slipping, but plummeting. According to a Eurobarometer survey in October
2003, Europeans considered the United States a threat to world peace. Some countries,
like Greece, Spain, Finland, and Sweden, even viewed the United States as a greater
world threat than Iran or North Korea.191 During German electoral campaigning, the
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German minister of justice sought to gain public approval by comparing Bush’s policies
and strategies to those of Hitler. Comparisons to Hitler were a step too far, even for the
angry German public, and Schroeder quickly moved to apologize to the United States,
but the damage had been done.192
In the past, Germany and the United States had openly praised the maturity of
their relationship. The war in Afghanistan led to an increase in international tensions
between the two countries and the German refusal to join the war in Iraq created mutual
incomprehension. Political interests, values, leadership styles, growing antiwar sentiment
in Europe, diametrically opposed domestic constraints and expectations with regard to the
electoral consequences of the use of force all came together in a powerful clash between
two different political cultures. Most Germans did not agree with America that the long
struggle against global terrorism was in fact a war. Bush continued to try and link the
conflict between Afghanistan and Iraq, but Germans were not buying the American
argument.
The buildup to the Iraq War and the subsequent United States invasion were fully
covered by German television as many of the larger news stations devoted nearly fifty
percent of their air time to the war.193 Media coverage of Iraq built upon German
concerns and public complaints about Afghanistan and a German public, highly
sensitized to war, tuned in to learn more about what was happening in the Middle East.
American news stations largely interpreted information coming out of Iraq as evidence
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that the United States needed to go to war. The German media tried to provide a broader
perspective that suited German viewers and offered hope that Iraq was seeking to
cooperate with the United Nations and the United States. Much of the information
regarding Afghanistan revolved around humanitarian aid and the good that German
soldiers were doing. Criticisms of Americans and American policies were also strongly
evident in Afghanistan coverage and that trend continued with regards to Iraq. The
German company Media Tenor reported through its content analysis of German media
that the press did not critically distance itself from growing anti-Americanism that had
started to develop during the war in Afghanistan. The German media seemed to jump on
the anti-war band wagon even as it was critical of Schroeder and his government.194
News stations, like ARD and ZDF, ran stories about the high numbers of civilian
casualties that the United States was creating during the very early phases of the invasion
of Iraq. On February 21, 2003, Christoph Maria Froehder reported for ARD that Iraqis
were having trouble understanding why America was invading and that the idea of
weapons of mass destruction was a lie.195 ARD and ZDF also openly reported and
criticized the United States for bombing areas inhabited by the Kurds in northern Iraq in
2003. The United States was also questioned for shooting at the Hotel Palestine in
Baghdad even though that building was generally understood to be a media headquarters
where many journalists regularly rented rooms. Froehder reported that Iraqis were
beginning to plunder homes and shops because of fear over what would happen when the
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American soldiers came through.196 German media continued to provide very similar
coverage of Iraq as had been done in Afghanistan. Anti-war feelings for Afghanistan
based on humanitarian concerns, historic anti-war fears, and disagreements over U.S.
policies continued to pervade German airwaves and strike a chord with the German
public.
The next few years actually led to an increase of German involvement in
Afghanistan since the German government was trying to mitigate the stress placed on
U.S.-German relations after Germany’s refusal to enter Iraq. Increased emphasis was
placed on convincing the German public that the Bundeswehr’s mission was one of peace
and not of war. In 2005, Defense Minister Peter Struck announced that “Without the
ISAF troops Afghanistan would not have made the successful political developments of
the last four years. We do not conduct a war campaign, but a peacekeeping mission.”197
Stability in German controlled Afghan provinces and seeming humanitarian success did
not raise German public support for the war, but did maintain stable public approval of
just under fifty percent for the next few years.198
2007 and 2008 represented a surprising increase in public approval for
Afghanistan under Minister of Defense Franz Josef Jung, who had a policy of avoiding
German casualties at all costs. Jung referred to simple metrics that would bolster his
claim of progress and accomplishments achieved by the ISAF missions. Schools built,
roads paved, and Afghan National Security Forces trained and equipped were a part of
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every speech delivered by Jung on Afghanistan. However, by 2009 Jung was forced to
publicly admit that Germany was involved in an actual war and public approval dropped
to new lows, never to rise again.199 By 2011, German approval for the war in Afghanistan
had dropped down to around thirty percent.200 Germany would finally announce the
withdrawal of all troops from Afghanistan in 2014, despite having claimed since 2001
that they would remain in Afghanistan until proper peace and stability had been
achieved.201
Afghanistan may have been overshadowed and generally taken out of the German
public’s view from 2003-2007 because of the war in Iraq, but the two conflicts and the
anti-war feelings are generally linked. Afghanistan was barely accepted by the German
public as an acceptable war since there were enough humanitarian justifications to match
German concerns over increased German military activity and foreign deployment.
Schroeder’s government managed to allay German historical concerns just enough to
send and maintain troops in Afghanistan. However, the German public’s distaste for war,
which had been straining against the war in Afghanistan, burst forth when the United
States announced that it wanted to invade Iraq and requested German aid. Schroeder’s
administration quickly realized that the public had been pushed too far and chose to
oppose the war as the Iraq War basically signaled that the attempt by the German
government to shift public opinion in favor of foreign deployment had failed.
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Conclusion
Ultimately, the German government’s attempts at gaining public support for the
war in Afghanistan were not very successful. Although the arguments implemented by
the government were not wholly ineffective and managed to maintain a high enough level
of support for the first few years of the war to justify a continued troop presence, an
ongoing drop in support led to eventual withdrawal. The three main themes employed in
support of the war--supporting Germany’s allies, atoning for Germany’s past mistakes,
and the need for humanitarian aid--fell on increasingly deaf ears in Germany.
Even though World War II had ended over 50 years before Germany deployed to
Afghanistan, many of the same concerns that had plagued Germans after the war
continued to undermine support for the war in the Middle East. German’s rejection of
Prussian militarism and fears that such militarism might return provided a framework
through which many Germans maintained a negative view of any military actions.
Ludger Volmer evoked memories of how Prussia and Imperial Germany resorted to
military might to resolve diplomatic issues, and how militaristic values fed into National
Socialism and established the foundation for Hitler’s rise to power continued to haunt
many Germans. Volmer had been discussing the development of German pacifism that
stemmed from cultural memories of World War II.202 Germany’s first postwar
Chancellor, Konrad Adenauer, had reinforced the anti-militarism mindset by blaming
World War II on German militarism, and subsequent German military policy tried to

202

See Chapter 3, pg. 22.
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create a new type of military than what Germany had in the past. The new military was
designed as a moral, defensive instrument of the civilian government with a focus on
humanitarian aid and producing autonomous civilian soldiers. Concerns that Germany’s
military actions in Afghanistan did not fit within the framework of a multilateral
diplomatic model arose and weakened many arguments utilized by the government.
The justification that the German military was carrying out humanitarian aid
was not overly successful either. The German government pushed this particular
argument more than any of the others. Many Germans were simply not convinced that
Afghanistan was in desperate humanitarian need. Invading Afghanistan began to seem
more like an attempt by the United States to gain revenge for the destruction of the World
Trade Center and less like a true attempt to root out international terrorism. In fact,
concerns over American strategies, objectives, and tactics began to cause disapproval for
the war in Afghanistan and undermine the government argument that Germany needed to
remain tied to the West, so that Germany would never again stand alone.
Anti-Americanism began to emerge more strongly after the election of George W.
Bush and became strongly evident in the protests surrounding the Iraq War. Resistance to
the conflict in Afghanistan was given full voice when America announced its intentions
to invade Iraq and German leaders were forced to take voter interests into account. The
Schroeder Administration had been strongly supportive of backing American policies
regarding the war in Afghanistan. Schroeder even gave lip service to German support of
an Iraq invasion. The German public’s anti-war outcry in 2002 drove Schroeder to
publicly recant any support he might have given to American policies and take to the
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streets with the protestors, so that he could retain his position of chancellor in the next
election.
The decision to send troops overseas was made shortly after the terrorist attacks
on the World Trade Center during an emotional moment in history. German politicians
jumped to send troops to Afghanistan despite many concerns over German soldiers
becoming involved in fighting. The German government tried to get ahead of any protests
and started laying out their justifications for German involvement. Approval ratings
dropped swiftly and anti-war editorials, protests, newspaper articles, speeches, etc. began
to abound, but Germany did not begin to pull out until 2014. Did German public opinion
have no effect? Were concerns ignored by the government again as unpopular policies
were pushed through? Observing government reactions and policies after the war started
demonstrates that public opinion had a very real effect. The German government
appeared to go out of its way to avoid troop casualties by stationing troops in low risk
areas and limiting the combat of troops already stationed in Afghanistan. Negative public
opinion certainly kept Germany from diving full force into any conflict. Government
officials in the Schroeder administration became concerned that they would not get reelected because of their pro-war stances. Protests against the Iraq War provided
Schroeder and his administration a clear opportunity to come across as anti-war.
Schroeder sacrificed good relations with the United States and pursued a very different
policy from his Afghanistan policy to change voter minds.
Continued negative public opinion eventually forced the German government to
consider withdrawing troops from Afghanistan despite having made promises to remain
there until Afghanistan had been rebuilt. First, the German government admitted that
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Afghanistan was indeed a war and not just a peaceful humanitarian mission. Second,
plans were put in place for withdrawal by 2014. Just like in the past 50 years, German
peace movements had not created any immediate sweeping change, like an early military
withdrawal, but did demonstrate that the government could not afford to ignore them for
fear of being voted out of office. Policies could be pushed through, but public opinion
had to be respected and could encourage strong change in policy through determined and
consistent resistance.
This thesis becomes particularly relevant in light of recent events in the Middle
East and the re-deployment of German troops to combat terrorism. Threats by ISIS and
bombings in several major European cities during 2015 and 2016 has re-kindled German
support of anti-terrorist activity. Germans have been willing to show support for new
actions in the Middle East as world peace appears to be under attack once more. Gaining
public support of military actions since the end of the Cold War relied on German
perceptions of legitimate humanitarian and even genocidal threats. ISIS appears to
represent that type of danger and Germany seems to be willing to help NATO oppose the
Islamic State. Further mobilization by Germany also has raised concerns around the
world that the German military may become the same powerhouse it was 50 years ago.
Peter Schwarz, writing for the Global Research in 2010, stated that the German bombing
of tankers near Kunduz, Afghanistan resulted in a big German media cover up of the
event. Schwarz wrote that the first victims of militarism are truth and democracy and that
Germany’s reaction to the civilian deaths caused by the bombing indicated a big step

117

forward for German militarism.203 Even Joschka Fischer, writing for The World Post in
2015, declared concerns over Germany’s push to a position of power and dominance in
Europe through political and economic posturing.204 Fischer and others are wondering if
Germany is beginning to focus more on its national goals and less on cooperative
European goals and how that might influence how Germany’s military would be used in
the future.
Research for this paper suggests that concerns over the return of German
militarism are unfounded. The German public has emerged as a powerful anti-war force
that is willing to step up and criticize any overtly militaristic decisions made by the
German government. Most Germans expect a multilateral approach to German foreign
policy with military force as a last resort, and will work to oppose policy that sends in the
military before other options of been explored. Governments, even Germany’s, will
probably always look to the military as an important tool for protecting national
sovereignty and advancing national interests, but German society has advanced to a place
where the use of the military should be of little concern. Decades of peace movements
and confrontations with collective war guilt have created an anti-war mindset in Germany
that would be very difficult to overcome.
Germany emerged from World War II as a changed country. Democracy evolved
into a viable form of government for the German people and humanitarian concerns
became one of the focal points of German foreign policy. Germans have tried to distance
themselves from the militarism of Imperial Germany and Prussia. The pacifistic and anti203
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war elements of German society have become defenders of the new German philosophies
on military use and will continue to make sure that Germany remains a peaceful and
conscientious nation in the international sphere.
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